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Down Go the Forms: The Abrogation of Rule 84 




The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) has been, 
since its inception in 1938, to administer “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”
1
  In an effort to further the 
purpose of the Rules and simplify access to the federal courts, Rule 84 was 
promulgated in 1938 as part of the original Rules to have Official Forms in 
the Appendix (the Forms) to illustrate the simplicity and brevity the Rules 
contemplate.
2
  Over time, through amendments to Rule 84, the Forms 
became authoritative illustrations for guaranteed sufficiency under the 
Rules.
3
  However, in response to the growing complexity of litigation and 
the change to the pleading standards from notice pleading to plausibility 
pleading announced by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly
4
 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
5
 (commonly referred to as Twiqbal), the 
Judicial Conference recommended in September 2014 that Rule 84 and the 
Official Forms be abrogated through the Rules Enabling Act
6
 and the 
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 1.   FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 2.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938) (amended 1946). 
 3.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 practice commentary (“Rule 84 clarifies that each [F]orm is sufficient, 
meaning that a paper that follows a [F]orm will meet the requirements of the corresponding rule.  Of 
course, Rule 84 speaks to procedural sufficiency, not substantive sufficiency; a paper that follows 
the [F]orm ‘to the letter’ may still be defective in its substance.”). 
 4.   550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 5.   556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 6.   See infra text accompanying notes 37–51 (explaining the Rules Enabling Act process).  
First, the Advisory Committee recommended the proposal to abrogate Rule 84.  Upon 
recommendation of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee passed the proposal in May 
2014.  CCL’s Nannery Attends Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG. (June 2, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/blog/category/1092/.  The Judicial 
Conference of the United States then approved the amendment to abrogate in September 2014.  
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2014–2015, U.S.  COURTS 49–50 
(2014) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments 2014–2015], http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/frcp-
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Supreme Court approved in April 2015.
7
  After serving as an illustration of 
sufficiency under the Rules for seventy-six years, the Forms and Rule 84 
could be gone on December 1, 2015, if Congress does not intervene and stop 
abrogation during the remaining step of the Rules Enabling Act process.
8
  
Because of the magnitude of the amendments Rule 84 was considered 
alongside,
9
 the Rule 84 abrogation proposal received relatively little 




Although this is a seemingly simplistic change, this Comment will 
address how the abrogation of Rule 84 will have profound effects on civil 
litigation despite many of the arguments the Judicial Conference, the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee), the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee), 
and the Rule 84 Subcommittee have cited in favor of abrogation during the 
Rules Enabling Process.  This Comment will argue that abrogation of Rule 
84 will have a negative practical effect on the bench, the bar, and pro se 
litigants.  The only group that truly benefits from the abrogation of Rule 84 
is the Committees in the Rules Enabling Act Process who will no longer 
have the responsibility to modify the Forms to reflect the needs of modern 
                                                          
amendments—-redline-committee-notes.pdf; David Sellers, Judicial Conference Receives Budget 
Update, Forwards Rules Package to Supreme Court, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/09/16/judicial-conference-receives-budget-update-forwards-
rules-package-supreme-court.   
 7.   The Supreme Court approved of the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms on April 29, 
2015.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supreme Court Order, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Apr. 29, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Supreme Court Order], 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf.  The abrogation of Rule 
84 and the Forms is now submitted to Congress, and it will be effectively abrogated unless Congress 
intervenes prior to December 1, 2015.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012). 
 8.   “The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in 
which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule.  Such 
rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted 
unless otherwise provided by law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2074(a); see also Proposed Amendments 2014–
2015, supra note 7, at 49–50; 2015 Supreme Court Order, supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 9.   The amendment to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms was considered alongside Rule 37(e) 
regarding spoliation of electronically stored information and the Duke Rules Package amending 
Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 27, 30, 31, and 34 to make the disposition of civil actions more efficient.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 219–22 (describing the effect on Rule 84 and the Forms proposed 
amendment when considered alongside such other amendments); Committee on Rules of Practice 




 10.   28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012); see also May 2014 Standing Committee Meeting, supra 
note 9, at 421–25; Report to the Judicial Conference, U.S. COURTS 16 (Sept. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 
2014 Judicial Conference], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2014.pdf. 
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litigation.  More importantly, the abrogation of Rule 84 implicitly heightens 
the pleading standards despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment of 
Twiqbal as requiring heightened pleading.
11
  The Forms should be modified, 
rather than abrogated, to continue to serve as sufficient under Rule 84 
because of the negative effects abrogation will have on civil litigation and 
the heightened pleading standard that will inevitably result. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on Rule 84 and the 
Forms as well as the recent split in the federal courts regarding the validity 
of Rule 84 and the Forms following Twiqbal.  Next, Part II will present the 
different options considered by the Committees in the Rules Enabling Act 
process to address the concerns surrounding Rule 84 and the Forms.  Part II 
concludes with the ultimate decision of the Advisory Committee, the 
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court to 
abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms.
12
 
Part III first explores the seven reasons cited throughout the Rules 
Enabling Act process in favor of abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms in 
detail.
13
  Part III addresses the seven reasons in favor of abrogation 
ultimately as two overarching motivations for abrogation—(1) the Forms 
and Rule 84 creating tension with Twiqbal and (2) the Forms simply not 
being useful in modern litigation.
14
  First, this Comment will argue in Part 
III that despite the Advisory Committee’s statement that abrogation of Rule 
84 and the Forms does not “bear[] on the evolution of pleading standards,”
15
 
the abrogation impliedly endorses Twiqbal as incompatible with Form 
pleading and directs the standard as heightened going forward.
16
  Secondly, 
this Comment will address in Part III how the Forms remain useful in 
modern litigation and the negative effects of abrogation on the bench, the 
bar, and pro se litigants.
17
  Part III concludes that the Forms should be 
modified to serve modern litigation needs as opposed to abrogated as the 
Judicial Conference, Standing Committee, and Advisory Committee have 
proposed.
18
  This Comment, ultimately, suggests that a subcommittee of the 
Advisory Committee charged with modifying the current Forms, creating 
                                                          
 11.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Here, . . . we do not require 
heightened fact pleading of specifics . . . .”). 
 12.   See discussion infra Parts II.A–E. 
 13.   See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 14.   See discussion infra Parts III.B–C. 
 15.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. COURTS 410 (Nov. 1–2, 2012) [hereinafter 
November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-10.pdf. 
 16.   See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 17.   See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 18.   See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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new Forms, and maintaining the Forms in the future could solve many of the 
concerns about the Forms. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will first address the reason for adoption of Rule 84 and the 
changes made to Rule 84.  Secondly, the section will introduce the Forms 
and their evolution over time.  Thirdly, the section will present the split in 
the federal courts regarding the sufficiency of the Forms following 
Twiqbal.
19
  Fourthly, the Advisory Committee concluded Rule 84 and the 
Forms needed change, so this section will introduce the options the Advisory 
Committee offered to address Rule 84 and the Forms.  Lastly, this section 
will present the Advisory Committee’s decision ultimately to abrogate Rule 
84 and the Forms. 
A. The Adoption and Amendments of Rule 84 
Rule 84 was included in the original Rules adopted in 1938.
20
  At the 
time of original promulgation, the Advisory Committee noted that a number 
of state codes used forms to guide pleading.
21
  Therefore, during adoption, 
the original drafters of the Rules made provisions for a limited number of 
Official Forms to “serve as guides in pleading.”
22
  The original Rule 84 
(then Rule 86) stated the Forms attached in an Appendix to the Rules were 
“intended to indicate . . . the simplicity and brevity of statement which the 
[R]ules contemplate.”
23
  However, it was unclear whether the Forms merely 
acted as illustrations or sufficed to withstand attacks for compliance with the 
requirements of the Rules.
24
  Courts determined that use of the Forms was 
discretionary and not mandatory.
25
  A number of the courts upheld the use of 
the Forms as sufficient for withstanding attack under the Rules,
26
 while 
                                                          
 19.   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 20.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938) (amended 1946). 
 21.   See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 147 (1932) (repealed 1975). 
 22.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment (amended 1946). 
 23.   Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843, 844 (3d Cir. 1939) (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938)).  
 24.   See, e.g., Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546, 546 (S.D. Cal. 1938) 
(explaining that the Forms of complaint given under the Rules merely “indicate the simplicity and 
brevity” of the statement of the Rules which they contemplate; even if copied, this does not bar 
dismissal for failure to state sufficient facts); but see Green v. McGaughy, 1 F.R.D. 604, 605 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1940) (explaining that the Forms of complaints are sufficient under the Rules). 
 25.   See, e.g., Fahs v. Merrill, 142 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1944) (“[T]he Forms are not 
mandatory.”). 
 26.   See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Young, 107 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1939); Ramsouer v. Midland 
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others saw the Forms merely as suggestive.
27
 
In 1946, Rule 84 was amended to resolve the split in the courts on the 
purpose of the Forms.
28
  The amendment provided that “the [F]orms 
contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the [R]ules and are 
intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the 
[R]ules contemplate.”
29
  The Advisory Committee Note for the 1946 
amendment confirmed that the Forms contained in the Appendix of Forms 
were “sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules under which they are 
drawn, and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to that 
extent.”
30
  Thus, the insertion of the words “sufficient under the [R]ules” 
strengthened Rule 84; to the extent that when the Forms were properly used, 
they were “invulnerable to attack under the [R]ules.”
31
 
Between 1946 and 2007, the Advisory Committee proposed only one 
amendment to Rule 84 in 1989.
32
  The proposed 1989 amendment would 
have substituted a practice manual for the Appendix of Forms.
33
  Like Rule 
84 and the Appendix of Forms, the proposed practice manual would have 
been “sufficient under these [R]ules and any local district court rules and 
[were] intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement that these 
[R]ules contemplate.”
34
  It was proposed that the Judicial Conference could 
amend the practice manual on recommendation of the Standing Committee 
to expedite the amendment process.
35
  Thus, the proposed process would 
circumvent the formalities of the lengthy Rules Enabling Act process.
36
 
                                                          
Valley R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 101, 107 (8th Cir. 1943) (“Rule 84 of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for an [A]ppendix of [F]orms intended to indicate ‘the simplicity and brevity of statement 
which the rules contemplate.’  Form 9 sets out a general allegation of negligence as sufficient.  
Plaintiff’s complaint contains such a general allegation of negligence.”); Sparks v. England, 113 
F.2d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 1940) (“The [A]ppendix of [F]orms accompanying the rules illustrates how 
simply a claim may be pleaded and with how few factual averments.”); Sierocinski, 103 F.2d at 844 
(reversing defendant’s motion to strike an amended complaint concisely alleging negligence). 
 27.   See Washburn, 25 F. Supp. at 546 (sustaining a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of facts 
stated when the plaintiff claimed to have copied the Forms); see also Emp’rs’ Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of 
Wis. v. Blue Line Transfer Co., 2 F.R.D. 121, 123 (W.D. Mo. 1941). 
 28.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1946) (amended 2007). 
 29.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 30.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (amended 2007).  
 31.   Van Horn v. Chi. Roller Skate Co., 15 F.R.D. 22, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1953); see also Kurtz v. 
Draur, 434 F. Supp. 958, 960–61 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that a jurisdictional statement modeled 
after Form 2(a) in the Appendix of Forms was adequate and was not subject to dismissal). 
 32.   Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, U.S. COURTS 47 (March 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Standing Committee Meeting], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Reports/ST03-1989.pdf. 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id.  
 35.   Id. 
 36.   Id.; see also Federal Rules of Practice & Procedure, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
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The Rules Enabling Act is the rulemaking process through which the 
Rules and the Forms are adopted, amended, and abrogated.
37
  The Rules 
Enabling Act states that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for 
cases in the United States district courts . . . .”
38
  The work and oversight of 
the process the Supreme Court delegated to the Judicial Conference, which 
is the “principal policy-making body of the U.S. Courts.”
39
  The Judicial 
Conference consists of the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each circuit, the 
chief judge of the Court of International Trade and one district judge from 
each judicial circuit.
40
  The Judicial Conference has allocated to the Standing 
Committee the responsibility to “carry on a continuous study of the 
operation and effect” of the Rules.
41
  Underneath the Standing Committee, 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is the initial evaluating body of all 
of the proposals for the civil rules.
42
  The Standing Committee then reviews 
the findings of the Advisory Committee, and the Standing Committee 
recommends the change to the Judicial Conference.
43
  Following 
recommendation by the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court considers 
the proposals and officially promulgates the Rules.
44
  The Supreme Court 
must transmit a proposed rule of practice and procedure to Congress by May 
1 of the year in which the rule is to take effect.
45
  Congress has retained 
power to review any proposed rule of practice and procedure.
46
  Congress 
may object to the proposed Rule or do nothing, and the proposed Rule will 
take effect.
47
  The proposed Rule takes effect no earlier than December 1 of 
the year of its transmission to Congress.
48
  The Rules Enabling Act process 
can take two to three years,
49
 so any Rule needing constant updating is 
                                                          
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).  
 37.  How the Rulemaking Process Works, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, [hereinafter 
Rulemaking Process], http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-
rulemaking-process-works.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
 38.   28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).   
 39.   Rulemaking Process, supra note 37. 
 40.   28 U.S.C. § 331. 
 41.   Rulemaking Process, supra note 37 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 331). 
 42.   Id.  
 43.   Id.  
 44.   Id.  
 45.   28 U.S.C. § 2074.  
 46.   Rulemaking Process, supra note 37. 
 47.   Id.  
 48.   Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074.  The abrogation of Rule 84 is in this part of the Rules 
Enabling Act process.  The Supreme Court has submitted the abrogation of Rule 84 to Congress.  It 
will become effective unless Congress intervenes prior to December 1.  2015 Supreme Court Order, 
supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 49.  About the Rulemaking Process, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
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difficult.  Although the 1989 practice manual was an attempt to have the 
ability to constantly update the Forms, there was concern that the 1989 
practice manual granted power to the Judicial Conference that it did not 
possess in the Rules Enabling Act because the Forms were never sent to the 
Supreme Court or Congress for approval.
50
  For that reason, the amendment 
for the practice manual was never adopted.
51
 
Rule 84 went sixty-one years untouched before it was amended a second 
time in 2007.
52
  This amendment, which brought Rule 84 into active voice, 
was part of a general restyling of the “Rules to make them more easily 
understood” and consistent.
53
  The amendment did not have any substantive 
impact on the Rule as it now reads, “[t]he [F]orms in the Appendix suffice 
under these [R]ules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these 
[R]ules contemplate.”
54
  This is now the current version of Rule 84.
55
 
B. The Forms 
Since the adoption of the Rules in 1938, a number of Forms have been 
appended to the Rules to indicate the simplicity and brevity of the statement 
that the Rules contemplate.
56
  Charles Clark, a judge on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and chief drafter of the Rules in 
1938,
57
 explained the purpose of the Forms: 
We do not require detail.  We require a general statement.  How much?  
Well, the answer is made in what I think is probably the most important 
part of the [R]ules so far as this particular topic is concerned, namely, 
the Forms.  These are important because when you can’t define you can 
at least draw pictures to show your meaning.
58
 
                                                          
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
 50.   Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1040 n.182 (1989) (“[T]he proposed 
rule would partially supersede § 2072, substituting the Conference for the Court, and § 2074, 
dispensing with submission to Congress. . . . I have serious doubts whether such a grant of 
rulemaking power can be accomplished by Federal Rule.”). 
 51.   See 1989 Standing Committee Meeting, supra note 32, at 47.  
 52.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84.  
 53.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.  
 54.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (emphasis added). 
 55.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
 56.   See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms. 
 57.   PENINAH R.Y. PETRUCK, JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115 (1991) (naming Clark as 
the “prime instigator and architect” of the Federal Rules). 
 58.   Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L. REV. 177, 181 (1957–
58). 
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Originally, there were 27 Forms.
59
  To date, there are 36 Forms total—
12 of which are pleading Forms and 24 of which are Forms other than for 
pleading.
60
  The pleading Forms have drawn the most attention over the 
history of the Rules.  The twelve pleading Forms set forth complaints for a 
variety of circumstances.
61
  The modern illustrative pleading Forms, for 
example, demonstrate a complaint for negligence,
62
 a complaint for 
conversion,
63
 and a complaint for patent pleading.
64
  The pleading Forms 
particularly came under increased scrutiny following the decisions in 
Twiqbal,
65
 which changed the pleading standards from notice pleading to 
plausibility pleading.
66
  There are also Forms that set forth examples of 
                                                          
 59.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938) (amended 1946) (including only 27 Forms in total).  It is unclear 
how many of the 1938 Forms were pleading forms.  Form 9 was a complaint for negligence in the 
1938 version of the Rules.  See, e.g., Watson v. World of Mirth Shows, 4 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D. Ga. 
1944) (“According to the illustrative form of a Complaint for Negligence, . . . it is only necessary to 
allege that defendant acted negligently and as a result the plaintiff was injured.”); Wild v. Knudsen, 
1 F.R.D. 646, 647 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); Kriesak v. Crowe, 36 F. Supp. 127, 130 (M.D. Pa. 1940).  
Form 10 was a complaint for negligence where the plaintiff did not know which of two people were 
negligent.  Fowler v. Baker, 32 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Pa. 1940).  Form 2 in the 1938 Rules was 
used as a statement of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. v. Cohen, 27 F.Supp. 735, 736 
(E.D.N.Y. 1939).  Form 27 was a notice for appeal.  See, e.g., Fahs v. Merrill, 142 F.2d 651, 652 
(5th Cir. 1944).   
 60.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
 61.   FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 10–21. 
 62.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 63.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 15. 
 64.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18. 
 65.   Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009). 
 66.   James A. Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 
491, 491–92 (1948).  Pleading under the Rules (also known as “notice pleading”) and the pleading 
Forms were a response to the failures of prior pleading systems.  See, e.g., Peter Julian, Comment, 
Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of Generality”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1179, 1183–84 (2010).  Prior to the Rules, there were historically two systems of pleading—English 
common law pleading and code pleading.  Id. at 1184.  First, common law pleading was the era of 
“special pleading,” which was “stiff and complex pleading . . . which prevented many plaintiffs from 
ever having their day in court.”  Id.  The writ system and issue pleading exemplify the special 
pleading system of the common law.  Id.  The writ system “required a plaintiff to bring his suit under 
a single correct form of action or have his case dismissed,” which was difficult because writs 
“overlapped” and the plaintiff could only plead one writ on a “borderline” case.  Id.  “Issue pleading 
required parties to work through pretrial averments and denials until they had narrowed the case to a 
single disputed issue of law or fact.”  Id.  The rigid common law pleading system “led to a popular 
call for reform by citizens who recognized that procedural obstacles denied people access to the 
courts, and thus worked against fundamental fairness.”  Id. at 1185.  Second, following the common 
law pleading system, pleading was statutorily reformed to a system called code pleading.  Id. at 
1186.  “Code pleading replaced issue pleading with fact pleading, and replaced the writ system with 
a single form of action - the civil action.”  Id.  Fact pleading in the code system required that “the 
parties stated the facts and the court applied the law.”  Id.  An example of the code pleading system 
is: 
[T]he law might provide the major premise that all people who ride horses in an 
unreasonable manner are negligent.  The complaint could allege the minor premise that a 
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various stages of litigation including summons, motion to dismiss, and 
motion to bring in a third-party defendant.
67
 
Early in the Forms’ existence, critics were concerned that the Forms 
would make pleadings become “skeletonized” with a complete lack of 
facts.
68
  One concern was that the Forms, including motions, complaints, 
answers, depositions, and affidavits, did not advise the court, lawyers, and 
                                                          
person had ridden a horse blindfolded and run over a child.  The court could then apply 
the alleged facts to the law and deduce that the plaintiff had a negligence claim against 
the rider.  
Id.  The problem with code pleading came from “requiring plaintiffs to state only ‘ultimate facts’ 
unadulterated by legal conclusions or evidence . . . .  [N]o bright line exist[ed] between different 
types of facts.  For example, a person’s marital status and ownership of property are facts that can be 
essential to a complaint but are also legal conclusions.”  Id. at 1187.  Both systems proved to be too 
complex and rigid, so Charles Clark developed pleading standards under the Rules.   
 67.   See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 3, 40, 41.  Another example of a non-pleading Form included in 
the Rules is Form 6, which is a waiver of the service of summons.  It states:  
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a 
copy of the complaint . . . .  I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of 
serving a summons and complaint in this case . . . . I understand that I, or the entity I 
represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s jurisdiction, and 
the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of 
service. 
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 6.  The Appendix of Forms also includes a statement of jurisdiction.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. Form 7.  It gives an example of how to state subject matter jurisdiction.  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 
7.  For diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, Form 7 states: 
The plaintiff is [a citizen of State A] [a corporation incorporated under the laws of State 
A with its principal place of business in State A].  The defendant is [a citizen of State B] 
[a corporation incorporated under the laws of State B with its principal place of business 
in State B].  The amount in controversy, without interest and costs, exceeds the sum or 
value specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.   
Id. (emphasis omitted).  For federal question jurisdiction, the Form states, “This action arises under 
[the United States Constitution; specify the article or amendment and the section] [a United States 
treaty; specify] [a federal statute, ___ U.S.C. § ___].”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  A final example of a 
Form other than a pleading Form is Form 80, which is notice of a magistrate judge’s availability.  
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 80.  Form 80 states:  
A magistrate judge is available under title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to conduct the proceedings 
in this case, including a jury or nonjury trial and the entry of final judgment.  But a 
magistrate judge can be assigned only if all parties voluntarily consent. . . . You may 
withhold your consent without adverse substantive consequences.  The identity of any 
party consenting or withholding consent will not be disclosed to the judge to whom the 
case is assigned or to any magistrate judge. . . . If a magistrate judge does hear your case, 
you may appeal directly to a United States court of appeals as you would if a district 
judge heard it.  
Id.  This Form is used to ensure parties have notice of the opportunity to consent to trial before a 
magistrate judge.  It also informs the parties that consent may be withheld without adverse 
consequences.  Id.  Form 80 may be used in concert with “[a] [F]orm called Consent to an 
Assignment to a United States Magistrate Judge [] available from the court clerk’s office.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted).  In total, there are 24 non-pleading Forms.  See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 80.   
 68.  12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3161 (2d ed. 
1997). 
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parties prior to trial what questions were to be decided.
69
  The second 
concern critics expressed was that it would be easy for the Forms to mislead 
counsel because they concerned exceedingly simple factual situations.
70
  
Where more facts were involved, many critiqued that the Forms discouraged 
pleading “at greater length and with greater particularity.”
71
  The third 
concern expressed was that the Forms might cause unnecessary and 
burdensome discovery because the Forms could leave uncertainty as to the 
issues.
72
  The fourth and final concern was that the minimal requirements of 
the Forms would spark unfounded litigation.
73
  History has proven these 
apprehensions were generally unfounded.
74
 
Over the seventy-six year history of the Forms, there have been an 
estimated thirty modifications since their original promulgation.
75
  
Modifications include amendments to existing Forms, additions of new 
Forms, and deletions of unnecessary Forms.
76
  Changes to the Forms are 
almost always made in conjunction with the corresponding Rule they 
illustrate.
77
  Therefore, most changes to the Forms have generally been 
gradual. 
C. Plausibility Pleading, Modern Litigation, and the Official Forms 
Opposition to the Forms following the decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. 
                                                          
 69.   Elwood Hutcheson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 WASH. L. REV. 198, 
206 (1938). 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   Id. 
 72.   Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 68, § 3161 (“Although concern has grown about abuse of 
litigation, early apprehensions that the pleadings might become too skeletonized have been proven 
largely unjustified.”). 
 75.   Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, 
and the Forms 5 n.39 (Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 14-09, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375042 
(citing the difficulty in determining the exact number of modifications because the Forms were 
renumbered and changed significantly in the 2007 restyling). 
 76.   Id. at 5–8. 
 77.   For example, Form 22-A (now Form 4) was intended to serve as a summons and complaint 
against a third-party defendant.  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 4.  Under the amendment of Rule 14(a) for 
third-party practice, a defendant who filed a third-party complaint not later than ten days after 
serving his answer did not have to obtain leave of the court to bring in a third-party defendant under 
Rule 4.  Id.  To reflect an earlier amendment to Rule 14(a) making it permissive, rather than 
mandatory to answer the plaintiff’s complaint, Form 22-A was amended to delete the words “and an 
answer to the complaint of the plaintiff, a copy of which is herewith served upon you.”  Report of the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. COURTS 81 (Sept. 1, 1962), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1962.pdf.  
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v. Twombly
78
 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
79
 has played out in the federal courts 
specifically with disagreement on whether the Forms can be reconciled with 
Twiqbal plausibility pleading.  Some commentators have argued that the 
debate should be resolved in favor of the Forms because the legislative 
history and the plain text of Rule 84 support sufficiency for pleadings pled 
consistently with the Forms.
80
  The federal courts, however, are split on 
whether the plausibility pleading standard has rendered the Forms 
unusable.
81
  Surprisingly, the Supreme Court itself in Twombly accepted the 
sufficiency of Form 9, which has since been modified and renumbered as 
Form 11, for pleading negligence as giving the proper notice required by 
Rule 8(a)(2)
82
 even under the newly espoused plausibility standard.
83
  
Clearly, the Supreme Court believed that the Forms and plausibility pleading 
could coexist. 
At least three circuit courts have found that Twiqbal does not undermine 
the viability of the Forms.
84
  First, in K-Tech Telecommunications, Inc. v. 
                                                          
 78.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (stating a claim must be plausible 
on its face and “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do . . . .”). 
 79.   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (creating a two-step process for determining the 
sufficiency of a complaint).  First, the court need not accept as true any allegations contained in the 
complaint that are merely legal conclusions.  Second, the complaint must state a plausible claim for 
relief on its face.  Id. at 678–79. 
 80.   See Rex Mann, What the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms Say about Twombly and 
Iqbal: Implications of the Forms on the Supreme Court’s Standard, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 501, 510–11 
(2011) (arguing that the legislative history and plain text of Rule 84 support the conclusion that the 
Forms provide sufficiency if pleadings are pled consistently with the Forms, regardless of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation). 
 81.   See cases cited infra notes 84–128 and accompanying text. 
 82.   FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”).  
 83.   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10 (noting that the pleading was insufficient for not 
mentioning the time, place or people involved in the alleged conspiracy in sharp contrast with the 
model form for pleading negligence, Form 9).  The Court indicated in Twombly that the Forms still 
sufficed under the newly espoused pleading standards, which rejected “conclusory allegations.”  Id.  
The Court supported Form 9 by stating “[a] defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple 
fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer . . . .”  Id. 
 84.   See cases cited infra notes 85–112.  Beyond the three circuits (Federal Circuit, Eighth 
Circuit, and First Circuit) mentioned below, the Second Circuit in Johnson v. American Towers, LLC 
briefly cited Form 11 with approval in post-Twiqbal pleading.  781 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 2015).  The 
court was determining the sufficiency of a pleading alleging “an inmate at the prison using a 
cellphone ordered a co-conspirator outside of the prison to kill Captain Johnson.”  Id. at 709.  The 
court cited Form 11’s requirement of “date” and “place” in the model complaint form for negligence 
as requiring more detail in the Johnsons’ claim.  Id.  The court ultimately dismissed the complaint 
because the wireless service provider would be unable to determine whether it carried the alleged 
call without further factual pleading.  Id.  Although there was no explicit discussion of whether the 
Forms are compliant with Twiqbal, the court implicitly cited such a proposition with approval by 
analyzing the pleading under the requirements of the Forms and Twombly.  This indicates the Second 
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Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
85
 a case analyzing Form 18 patent pleading, the 
Federal Circuit made clear that the Forms reign supreme if any conflict 
existed between Twiqbal and the Forms.
86
  The court contended, however, 
that because “Form 18 would control in the event of a conflict between the 
[F]orm and Twombly and Iqbal does not suggest . . . that we should seek to 
create conflict where none exists.”
87
  Judge Evan Wallach in concurrence 
believed any conflict between Rule 8(a)(2) and the adequacy of the Forms 
under Rule 84 could be reconciled through Twombly.
88
  Twombly expressly 
recognized the adequacy of the former Form 9 for pleading negligence under 
Rule 8(a)(2).
89
  Although Twombly addressed the adequacy of Form 9 and 
not Form 18, the Federal Circuit concluded that because Form 9 and Form 
18 are parallel in alleging as much “factual matter” and “conclusory 
allegations” as the other,
90
 both Forms, therefore, satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).  Thus, 
not only are the Forms controlling, the Forms also are reconcilable and 
adequate to satisfy the requisite Twiqbal standard.
91
 
Secondly, the Eighth Circuit recognized Twiqbal as reconcilable with 
Rule 84 because where courts have found incompatibility, there is an 
“unwarranted extension of the pleading standards.”
92
  In Hamilton v. Palm,
93
 
the court considered the sufficiency of Form 13 (“Complaint for Negligence 
Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act”) and how the general principles 
of Twiqbal applied to the pleading of a recurring common law issue of a 
party alleging he or she was an employee at the time of the claim.
94
  The 
defendant moved to dismiss for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) based on a 
failure to adequately plead an employee-employer relationship necessary to 
establish liability.
95
  The plaintiff had merely pled the defendant “employed” 
him.
96
  The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the 
complaint because Hamilton “merely allege[d] generally that he was 
Defendants’ employee and ha[d] not alleged facts to plausibly support such a 
                                                          
Circuit reasoned plausibility pleading and the Forms can coexist. 
 85.   K-Tech Telecomm. Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 86.   Id. at 1283.  
 87.   Id. at 1284.  
 88.   Id. at 1287–88 (Wallach, J., concurring).  
 89.   Id. at 1288. 
 90.   Id. at 1287–88. 
 91.   Id.  
 92.   Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 93.   Id. at 816. 
 94.   Id. at 818. 
 95.   Id. at 817. 
 96.   Id. 
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conclusion.”
97
  The Eighth Circuit reversed the motion to dismiss because 
“Form 13 makes clear that an allegation in any negligence claim that 
defendant acted as plaintiff’s ‘employer’ satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice 
pleading requirement.”
98
  As consistent with the Supreme Court’s charge in 
Iqbal,
99
 the court noted practically that “[c]ommon sense and judicial 
experience counsel that pleading this issue does not require great detail or 
recitation of all potentially relevant facts in order to put the defendant on 
notice of a plausible claim.”
100
  Thus, the Eighth Circuit explained that 
because employee status is a frequently litigated issue, this was a plausibly 
alleged claim.
101
  The Eighth Circuit interpreted Twiqbal as not necessarily 
departing from notice pleading where judicial experience and common sense 
dictate the level of specificity required.
102
 
Third, where the complaint is plainly modeled on the Forms, there are 
sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to make the claim plausible because 
Twiqbal recognized the latitude required in applying the plausibility 
standard.
103
  In García-Catalán v. United States,
104
 the First Circuit reversed 
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.
105
  This was a slip-and-fall case where the plaintiff pled that she 
“slipped and fell on liquid then existing there” and “[n]o sign warned that 
the floor was wet.”
106
  “Under Puerto Rico law, a business invitee [had to] 
prove that the owner . . . of premises had actual or constructive notice of a 
dangerous condition in order to recover for injuries.”
107
  The defendant 
argued that the plaintiff’s pleading had failed to allege that the defendant had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that allegedly 
existed.
108
  The First Circuit reversed the dismissal after noting that the 
complaint was plainly modeled on Form 11, which disclosed the date, place, 
and time of the alleged tort as well as delineating the nature of the dangerous 
                                                          
 97.   Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Palm, No. 4:09CV1341MLM, 2009 WL 3617489, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. Oct. 28, 2009)).  
 98.   Id. at 818–19. 
 99.   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). 
 100.   Hamilton, 621 F.3d at 819. 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.   García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 104.   Id. at 100. 
 105.   Id. at 105. 
 106.   Id. at 101–02. 
 107.   Id. at 102. 
 108.   Id.  
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condition and the injuries sustained.
109
  The First Circuit stated that 
plausibility pleading “properly takes into account whether discovery can 
reasonably be expected to fill any holes in the pleader’s case.”
110
  This is 
consistent with Twombly’s statement that the hallmark of plausibility is 
when a complaint contains “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence.”
111
  Where the defendant controls a 
material part of the information, then it is unreasonable to expect that 
plaintiff would have the information without discovery.
112
 
Some courts have recognized that the Forms suffice for simpler claims, 
but they are insufficient under Twiqbal with respect to more complex 
matters.
113
  In Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 
Illinois,
114
 the Seventh Circuit recognized that all claims—including claims 
with potentially complex or costly litigation—must have some degree of 
plausibility to survive dismissal.
115
  The Seventh Circuit’s view that the 
Forms were insufficient stated: 
[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case.  In a 
complex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found 
in the sample complaints in the [C]ivil [R]ules’ Appendix of Forms may be 
necessary to show that the plaintiff’s claim is not “largely groundless.”
116
 
The Seventh Circuit expressed concern that with cases like RICO or 
antitrust violations (“big” cases both monetarily and in terms of time), the 
defendant should not be put to the expense of discovery on the basis of a 
“threadbare claim.”
117
  Thus, because of the complexity and cost of modern 
litigation, the Forms are only useful in certain simpler claims.
118
 
Other courts have explicitly rejected the use of the Forms in light of 
Twiqbal.
119
  Recently, in Macronix International Co. v. Spansion Inc.,
120
 the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the Appendix of 
                                                          
 109.   Id. at 104–05. 
 110.   Id. at 104.  
 111.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 112.   García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 104.  The consumer plaintiffs in Twombly brought a class 
action alleging an antitrust conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.  
Ironically, the plaintiffs in that case undoubtedly could not have had facts regarding the conspiracy 
at the pleading stage.  However, the Court found the consumers’ allegations of “parallel conduct” 
were insufficient to state a plausible claim.  Id. at 564. 
 113.   See, e.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 114.   Id. at 797. 
 115.   Id. at 803.  
 116.   Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
 117.   Id.  
 118.   See id.  
 119.   See cases cited infra notes 120–30. 
 120.   4 F. Supp. 3d 797 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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Forms, specifically Form 18 for patent pleading, will not suffice as a short 
and plain statement of a claim that the pleader is entitled to relief under the 
pleading standards announced in Twiqbal.
121
  Despite the plaintiff’s 
argument that the Forms take precedence over the Supreme Court decisions, 
the court reasoned that the Supreme Court decisions on how to apply 
pleading standards are controlling and those decisions make the Forms no 
longer viable.
122
  Thus, Macronix called into doubt the validity of the Forms 
and Rule 84 in the wake of Twiqbal. 
Courts have recognized the tension between the Forms and Twiqbal 
outside of the patent pleading context as well.
123
  In McCauley v. City of 
Chicago,
124
 a case alleging equal protection violations against the City of 
Chicago, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the complaint for not plausibly 
stating a policy-or-practice equal protection claim and only containing 
generalized allegations.
125
  The complaint lacked plausibility despite its 
compliance with the Forms, and both the majority and dissenting opinions 
discussed at length the insufficiency of the Forms.
126
  Judge David 
Hamilton, who dissented in part, stated “Iqbal conflicts with the [F]orm 
complaints approved by the Supreme Court.”
127
  Judge Hamilton further 
reasoned the Forms “require virtually no explanation of the underlying facts 
as long as the defendant is informed of the event or transaction that gave rise 
to the claim.”
128 
 However, the tension lies in the fact that the Forms are 
sufficient under the Rules but are “remarkably ‘conclusory,’” which violates 
Iqbal.
129
  Judge Hamilton, thus, recognized that unless there was an 
explanation of how to reconcile the tension between Iqbal, Rule 9(b), and 
the Form complaints, then “Iqbal conflicts with the Rules Enabling Act . . . 
and the prescribed process for amending the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”
130
  Courts have found strong tension that is moving toward 
incompatibility between the plausibility pleading standards in Twiqbal and 
Rule 84 and the Forms. 
                                                          
 121.   See id. at 801.  
 122.   Id. at 801–02.  
 123.   E.g., McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting in part). 
 124.   Id. at 611 (majority opinion). 
 125.   Id. at 613. 
 126.   Id. at 622–23 (Hamilton, J., dissenting in part).  In the dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton 
reasoned that the “[F]orms simply conflict with Iqbal.”  Id. at 622. 
 127.   Id. at 623. 
 128.   Id. at 624. 
 129.   Id. (quoting part of the standard promulgated in Iqbal). 
 130.   Id. (citation omitted); see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) (“Specific 
pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general 
rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts.”). 
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D. The Different Options to Address Rule 84 
In November 2011, the Advisory Committee established a Rule 84 
Subcommittee led by Judge Gene Pratter of the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to “consider the current [F]orms and the 
process of their revision” following concerns surrounding Twiqbal.
131
  The 
Rule 84 Subcommittee developed a list of four different options to address 
Rule 84 and the Forms.
132
  The Rule 84 Subcommittee suggested: (1) do 
nothing;
133
 (2) perform a full-scale review of the Forms improving some of 
the current Forms and considering additions of new Forms;
134
 (3) retain Rule 
84 Forms, but leave initial responsibilities to the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts;
135
 or (4) follow one of the three Rule 84 sketches 
proposed.
136
  This Comment will address each suggestion in turn. 
The first suggestion from the Rule 84 Subcommittee was to do nothing 
and allow the Forms to continue being authoritative illustrations of 
guaranteed sufficiency under the Rules.
137
  The Subcommittee admitted 
“[t]he [F]orms do not appear to be a source of any stress or difficulty, apart 
from the [F]orm complaints.”
138
  After acknowledging that the Forms had 
gone unmodified and neglected for years with no real consequences, the 
Advisory Committee stated that the Forms could be left alone and only 
amended if pressing circumstances occurred.
139
  Also, while discussing this 
suggestion, the Subcommittee considered abandoning the Form complaints 
while maintaining the remaining Forms.
140
  Given that Rule 8(a)(2) and 
Twiqbal have been difficult for both the federal courts and practitioners to 
interpret, it seems counterintuitive to abandon the complaint Forms that 
could serve as illustrations of sufficiency. 
The second suggestion from the Rule 84 Subcommittee was to 
completely overhaul the Forms.
141
  The Advisory Committee considered 
“improving . . . the current [F]orms and considering the addition of new 
                                                          
 131.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at app. B-19.  
 132.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 409–11.  
 133.   See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. 
 134.   See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
 135.   See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
 136.   See infra notes 150–61.  November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 
409–11. 
 137.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 409. 
 138.   Id. 
 139.   Id. at 408.  See also infra text accompanying notes 186–94 (explaining that the Forms had 
not been systematically reviewed for many years and did not cover many areas of litigation). 
 140.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408–09. 
 141.   Id. at 409. 
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[F]orms . . . .”
142
  This would be the most burdensome option for the 
Advisory Committee given the number of Forms and the lack of 
modification over the recent history of the Forms.  The Advisory Committee 
stated, “This approach would require a heavy commitment of Enabling Act 
resources, particularly by the Advisory Committee.  It may be difficult to 
anticipate benefits commensurate with the costs.”
143
  The Rule 84 
Subcommittee suggested that the new Forms address the most frequently 
encountered Rules that a Form does not yet supplement.
144
  Given that the 
Forms have been generally untouched for decades, this was an alternative 
that would have made them more useful to the modern practitioner in 
modern litigation. 
The third suggestion was to retain the Forms but to delegate the 
modification of the Forms to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.
145
  The advice of the Administrative Office, which currently has its 
own set of forms, would be used in creating the Forms.
146
  Delegating the 
responsibility for the Forms to the Administrative Office would take a 
substantial burden off the Advisory Committee.
147
  However, the Advisory 
Committee expressed concern that a group outside the authority of the Rules 
Enabling Act process modifying the Forms was not legal.
148
  It is unclear 
whether using the Administrative Office to create the Forms would be within 
the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, but it seems that the same concerns as 
                                                          
 142.   Id.  The Rule 84 Subcommittee did not make clear what specific plans it had to modernize 
certain Forms, especially the Form complaints.  See id.  
 143.   Id. 
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Id. 
 146.   Id.  The Administrative Office forms are located on the United States Courts’ website.  
Civil Forms, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, [hereinafter Administrative Office Forms], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/civil-forms (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).  There are seventeen forms, 
which include forms for civil cover sheets; applications to proceed in district court without 
prepaying fees or costs; an order to proceed without prepaying fees or courts; subpoenas to appear 
and testify at a hearing or trial, to testify at a deposition, and to produce documents; notice of a 
lawsuit and request to waive service of a summons; waiver of the service of summons; summons in a 
civil action; summons on a third-party complaint; judgment in a civil case; clerk’s certification of a 
judgment to be a registered in another district; notice and consent of a civil action to a magistrate 
judge; notice and consent of a dispositive motion to a magistrate judge; and warrant for the arrest of 
a witness in a civil case.  Id.  Several of the Administrative Office forms overlap with the Forms in 
the Rules, including the summons in a civil action, summons on a third-party complaint, waivers of 
summons, and notice and consent of a civil action to a magistrate judge.  The Administrative Office 
forms do not cover as much of the litigation process as the Official Forms.  Compare id. 
(maintaining only seventeen forms), with FED. R. CIV. P. Forms (maintaining thirty-six forms).  The 
Administrative Office forms also do not have the guarantee of sufficiency Rule 84 provides the 
Official Forms.  FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (amended 2007) 
(explaining the Forms are sufficient under the Rules).  
 147.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 409. 
 148.   Id.  
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the 1989 practice manual proposal spoken about above may reoccur.
149
 
The fourth and final suggestion from the Rule 84 Subcommittee was to 
implement one of three sketches of Rule 84 drawn by the Rule 84 
Subcommittee.
150
  The three sketches drawn by the Rule 84 Subcommittee 
were variations of the Rule 84 language meant to retract the statement that 
the Forms suffice.
151
  The first proposed sketch of Rule 84 was abrogation, 
which proposed to delete the entirety of Rule 84 and the Forms.
152
  Thus, the 
illustration read: 
Rule 84. Forms [Abrogated (mo., day, yr., eff. mo., day, yr.).] 
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the 
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate. 
153
 
The second proposed sketch of Rule 84 was to delete “suffice.”
154
  The 
illustration, in this sketch, read: 
Rule 84. Forms. 
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the 
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.
155
 
The second sketch was a return to the 1938 version of Rule 84 where the 
Forms were merely illustrations as opposed to sufficient to withstand attack 
under the Rules.
156
  This version was considered to have “defanged” Rule 84 
by withdrawing the 1946 language about sufficiency.
157
  The Subcommittee 
expressed concern that: 
                                                          
 149.   See supra notes 32–36, 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing 1989 proposed 
amendment that would have substituted a practice manual for the Appendix of Forms; it was 
proposed that the Judicial Conference could amend the practice manual without the formalities of the 
Rules Enabling Act process). 
 150.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 410. 
 151.   Id. 
 152.   Id. at 410–11. 
 153.   Id. 
 154.   Id. at 411. 
 155.   Id. 
 156.   Rule 84, in 1938, read the Forms were intended “to indicate, subject to the provisions of 
these rules, the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 84 
(1938) (amended 1946).  The Rule was merely intended to supply an illustration, but nothing was 
said of the “sufficiency” of the forms to withstand attack under the rules.  Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont 
De Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843, 844 (3d Cir. 1939) (construing the 1938 version of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 84). 
 157.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 410. 
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The [F]orms would remain as mere illustrations of simplicity and 
brevity.  The line between illustration and implicit endorsement, 
however, is thin, and likely would become invisible to all but a few 
blessed to carry the memory of the current version.
158
 
The Subcommittee did not want to revert to the problems experienced 
pre-1946 amendment, when it was unclear whether the Forms were 
sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules.
159
 
The third proposed sketch of Rule 84 was aspirational.
160
  The final 
sketch read: 
Rule 84. Forms. 
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the 




The Rule 84 aspirational version was proposed to be a declarative 
statement of the purpose of the Rules rather than a Rule itself.
162
  The Rule 
84 Subcommittee noted that the wish for simplicity and brevity remaining in 




The Rule 84 Subcommittee, after considering all four options, ultimately 
recommended abrogation.
164
  Specifically, the Rule 84 Subcommittee stated 
that “[a]brogating the pleading [F]orms recognizes that litigation, pleading, 
and discovery have evolved in many ways since 1937 and 1946, and 
continue to evolve.”
165
  The abrogation would open the way for the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which is a support entity 
for the United States Federal Judicial Branch, to disseminate forms in lieu of 
any Official Forms.
166
  The Subcommittee stated the recommendation was 
made “with some lingering regrets . . . [and] the time ha[d] come to 
withdraw promulgation of ‘[O]fficial’ [F]orms from the Enabling Act 
                                                          
 158.   Id. 
 159.   See id. 
 160.   Id. at 411. 
 161.   Id. (footnote omitted). 
 162.   See id. 
 163.   Id. at 411 n.2.  
 164.   Id. at 407. 
 165.   Id. at 411–12. 
 166.   See 2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16; November 2012 Advisory Committee 
Meeting, supra note 15, at 412; see discussion supra note 146 (describing the Administrative office 
forms); Services & Forms, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).  




E. The Decision to Abrogate Rule 84 
In September 2014, the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
following the public comment period and upon recommendation of the 
Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee, officially approved the 
amendment to abrogate Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms.
168
  The Judicial 
Conference approved Rule 84 abrogation for reasons substantially similar to 
the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee, and the Rule 84 
Subcommittee.
169
  The proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms was then 
approved by the Supreme Court in April 2015, and it has been submitted to 




The Judicial Conference elected to keep Form 5, the request to waive 
service of summons,
171
 and Form 6, a waiver of service of summons.
172
  
Because Rule 4(d)(1)(D) reads that a request to waive service of the 
summons “inform the defendant, using text prescribed in Form 5, of the 
consequences of waiving and not waiving service,”
173
 the abrogation of Rule 
84 and the Forms mandated a way to address Rule 4(d)(1)(D).
174
  Rule 
4(d)(1)(D) does not require the Form 6 waiver of service of summons, but it 
is closely tied to and considered alongside Form 5.
175
  Ultimately, the only 
remaining remnants of the Forms, pending the submission period to 
Congress, will be Forms 5 and 6, which will be preserved by amending Rule 
                                                          
 167.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 407.  
 168.   Sellers, supra note 6; see also 2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16–17.  
 169.   See Sellers, supra note 6. 
 170.   2015 Supreme Court Order, supra note 7, at 31–32.  Congress has until December 1, 2015 
to intervene and stop abrogation or the change will become effective.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012). 
 171.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5. 
 172.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 6. 
 173.   FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(D) (2007) (amended Dec. 1, 2015, absent contrary Congressional 
action).  The amended rule (effective Dec. 1, 2015) will read: “The notice and request must: . . . 
inform the defendant, using the form appended to this Rule 4, of the consequences of waiving and 
not waiving service.”  Id. 
 174.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, U.S. COURTS 417 (Apr. 11–12, 2013) [hereinafter 
April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-
books/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2013. 
 175.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16.  The Advisory Committee considered a 
range of approaches including: (1) continuing Rule 84 and Forms 5 and 6 only; (2) striking from 
Rule 4(d)(1)(D) any requirement that a Form be used; (3) revising Forms 5 and 6 to become Rule 4 
Forms attached at the end of the Rule; (4) expanding the Rule 4(d)(1)(D) text to add more detail 
about the elements necessary for a request; or (5) using Rule 4(d)(1)(D) to mandate use of any Form 
for request and waiver that is approved by the Judicial Conference.  See April 2013 Advisory 
Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 220. 
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Given that the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court have 
recommended abrogation, this section will initially present the seven reasons 
articulated throughout the Rules Enabling Act process in favor of abrogation 
of Rule 84 and the Forms.  Although the arguments cited in favor of 
abrogation are many, they ultimately fall into two overarching categories: 
(1) the tension that exists between the Forms and Twiqbal cannot be 
permitted to remain; and (2) the Forms are not useful in modern litigation to 
judges, practitioners, or pro se litigants.  Upon further scrutiny, this section 
will argue these two reasons do not support abrogation.  Abrogation of the 
Forms and Rule 84 will only lead to further confusion—the solution should 
be to retain Rule 84 and amend the Forms instead of abrogate because 
modern litigation and the pleading standards will benefit if the Forms 
remain. 
A.  The Reasoning for Abrogating Rule 84 
In August 2013, the Advisory Committee published its proposal for 
public comment to abrogate Rule 84 and eliminate the Forms appended to 
the Rules.
177
  The Advisory Committee summarized its decision to abrogate 
Rule 84 and eliminate the Forms in the official note following the proposal, 
which stated: 
Rule 84 was adopted when the Civil Rules were established in 1938 “to 
indicate, subject to the provisions of these [R]ules, the simplicity and 
brevity of statement which the [R]ules contemplate.”  The purpose of 
providing illustrations for the [R]ules, although useful when the [R]ules 
were adopted, has been fulfilled.  Accordingly, recognizing that there 
are many alternative sources for forms, including the website of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the website of many 
district courts and local law libraries that contain many commercially 
published forms, Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer 
necessary and have been abrogated.  The abrogation of Rule 84 does 
not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the 
requirements of Civil Rule 8.
178
 
                                                          
 176.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16. 
 177.   Id. at app. B-19; Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, at 49.  
 178.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; 2015 Rules Transmittal 
Package, U.S. COURTS (Apr. 29, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Rules Package], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments.  The Advisory Committee Note 
 
346 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
Throughout the Rules Enabling process, a number of reasons, both 
explicit and implicit, have been advanced in favor of abrogation.  
Specifically, the seven reasons clearly cited throughout the process in favor 
of abrogation were: (1) the Forms are out of date;
179
 (2) amendment to the 
Forms would be cumbersome, resource consuming, and time consuming;
180
 
(3) lawyers rarely use the Forms;
181
 (4) pro se litigants rarely use the 
Forms;
182
 (5) there are alternative sources of civil forms;
183
 (6) the purpose 
for which the Forms were adopted has been fulfilled;
184
 and (7) the Forms 
are inconsistent with Twiqbal.
185
 
The first reason cited for abrogation was that the Forms were out of 
date.  The Forms have “languished in benign neglect, not because of 
indifference but because of competing demands on resources.”
186
  The 
Advisory Committee had not done a systematic review of the Forms for 
many years.
187
  Although the Forms were part of the 2007 overhaul of the 
Rules, the changes were only stylistic and did not address changes to the 
Rule’s text.
188
  These oversights have rendered the Forms somewhat 
antiquated in modern litigation.  For example, discovery is illustrated by 
three Forms: Forms 50, 51, and 52, which cover “a request to produce under 
Rule 34, a request for admissions under Rule 36, and the report of the Rule 
26(f) planning conference.”
189
  However, discovery is a much larger part of 
litigation than is demonstrated through these three simple forms—discovery 
is covered in Rules 26 to 37.
190
  The Advisory Committee noted that, “[a] 
quick review of Rule 26 will suggest many other important discovery issues 
                                                          
was changed to reflect requests by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2015.  Id. at 129 (subscribing 
changes to the comment in a letter from James C. Duff, the director of the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts, to Scott S. Harris, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States).  The Court 
requested that the Advisory Committee Note reflect that “the abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter 
existing pleading standards and [] identify other sources for civil procedure forms.”  Id.  To view the 
originally proposed Advisory Committee Note, see Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, 
at 49.  
 179.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408. 
 180.   Id. at 409. 
 181.   Id. at 408. 
 182.   Id. 
 183.   Id. 
 184.   Id. at 411. 
 185.   Id. at 407. 
 186.   Id. at 412. 
 187.   Id. at 408 (noting that the only Form the Advisory Committee had knowledge on was 
Form 5, which was “carefully crafted with the adoption of the Rule 4(d) provisions for waiving 
service of process”). 
 188.   Id. 
 189.   Id.  
 190.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
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that might benefit from guidance in a form,”
191
 including a Rule 26(b)(3)(C) 
request for a witness statement and Rule 26(b)(5)(A) creating a privilege 
log.
192
  Discovery is not the only area missing coverage in the full set of the 
Rules.
193
  Thus, the Advisory Committee concluded, “[T]he entire set of 
[F]orms is episodic.  Some might be tempted to find it almost eccentric.  Yet 
no thought has been given to filling out the set.”
194
 
The second reason cited in favor of abrogation was that updating the 
Forms would be cumbersome and that time would be better spent 
elsewhere.
195
  The Rule 84 Subcommittee’s main concern was with the 
Rules Enabling Act process.
196
  As discussed earlier in this Comment, 
proposals through the Rules Enabling Act process can take up to three years 
before passage because the process is rather arduous with numerous, lengthy 
steps.
197
  First, the Advisory Committee drafts changes and submits a 
proposal to the Standing Committee.
198
  If the Standing Committee passes 
the proposal, it goes to a six-month public comment period.
199
  Any changes 
must be re-passed through the Advisory Committee, then the Standing 
Committee, then the Judicial Conference, then the Supreme Court, and 
finally through Congress.
200
  A common concern with the Forms is that the 
Rules Enabling Act process is “not nimble enough to keep the Forms 




Opponents of the Forms argue that constantly updating the Forms 
through the Rules Enabling Act would come at the expense of and draw 
public attention away from more important projects.
202
  Some other pending 
projects the Advisory Committee cited include ongoing changes to 
                                                          
 191.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408. 
 192.   Id. 
 193.   Id. (“Discovery is not alone in suggesting gaps in coverage.  In comparison to the full set 
of Civil Rules, the entire set of forms is episodic. . . . Yet no thought has been given to filling out the 
set.”).  
 194.   Id. 
 195.  2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 94 (concluding “the Committee can better use 
its time addressing more relevant issues in the rules”). 
 196.   Rulemaking Process, supra note 37; see discussion supra notes 37–51 and accompanying 
text (explaining the Rules Enabling Act process). 
 197.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 93 (“The [Rules Enabling] process ordinarily 
takes at least three years.”); Rulemaking Process, supra note 37.  See also discussion supra notes 
37–49 and accompanying text (explaining the Rules Enabling Act process). 
 198.   The Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012)).  
 199.   Id.  
 200.   Id. 
 201.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 421. 
 202.   Id. at 409. 
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discovery, pleading, and class actions.
203
  The Advisory Committee stated 
discovery reform is the most pressing.
204
  According to the Advisory 
Committee, the projects that might be brought in the Rules Enabling Act 
process must be carefully chosen because of the length of time, amount of 
labor, and money spent on the Enabling Act process.
205
  It was concluded 
that “[d]evoting scarce Committee resources to sustained ongoing work on 
the [F]orms would come at a high cost.”
206
  The Advisory Committee also 
expressed concern that updating the Forms would divert the important 
resource of public engagement from the Rules to the Forms.
207
  The Rules 
Enabling Act process includes a six-month public comment period where the 
public is invited to engage with the proposed amendments to the Rules and 
create suggestions for new amendments.
208
  The Advisory Committee, 
despite having concluded that few members of the public commented or 
cared about the Forms, worried that changes to the Forms would “detract 
from the attention devoted to changes in the [R]ules themselves.”
209
  This is 
seemingly ironic given that one of the reasons cited for abrogation is that no 




The third and fourth reasons for abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms 
are that lawyers and pro se litigants rarely use the Forms.
211
  The Advisory 
Committee ended its inquiry into practitioner usage with the statement that 
“many lawyers rely on alternative sources of [F]orms.”
212
  There is no 
indication where this information came from.  With regard to pro se 
litigants, the Advisory Committee admitted that the Forms would be helpful 
but concluded that pro se parties likely did not know how to access or use 
the Forms.
213
  Like the lack of practitioner usage, it is once again unclear 
where this information came from other than a statement made during a Rule 
                                                          
 203.   Id. at 408–09. 
 204.   Id. at 409 (noting that “[d]iscovery is not likely to move off the agenda in the foreseeable 
future—the question tends to be which discovery issues press most urgently for attention, not 
whether discovery can be put aside for a while”). 
 205.   Id. at 408–09. 
 206.   Id. at 409. 
 207.   Id.  
 208.   28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2012) (“Any rule prescribed by a court . . . shall be prescribed only 
after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment.”).   
 209.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 409. 
 210.   See discussion infra text accompanying notes 217–28 (explaining that the August 2013 
public comment period had few comments regarding the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, and it 
was inferred from the lack of comments that few cared or used the Forms). 
 211.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408. 
 212.   Id.  
 213.   Id. at 421, 425. 
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84 Subcommittee meeting that “there seems to be little indication that pro se 
parties” use the forms.
214
  The Advisory Committee ultimately concluded 
that pro se litigants, like lawyers, could rely on other sources of forms that 
are more helpful than the Forms.
215
  For example, the Advisory Committee 
noted that even prison libraries provide forms.
216
 
No formal empirical study was ever conducted to determine whether 
practitioners or pro se litigants use the Forms.
217
  The only research done to 
explore practitioner and pro se usage was informal inquiries made by the 
Rule 84 Subcommittee in 2012.
218
  Based on limited inquiries to select 
clerk’s offices, pro se clerks, magistrate judges, and some lawyers, the Rule 
84 Subcommittee determined that Administrative Office forms were 
frequently used and the Official Forms were seldom used.
219
  Participants in 
the informal inquiries, however, attested that the Forms were useful for 
“young lawyers, and remain useful to ‘verify that pleadings are 
sufficient.’”
220
  The Rule 84 Subcommittee concluded, following the 
informal investigation, that even exploring more formal empirical research 
to determine true usage of the Forms would be a waste of time for the 
“crowded agenda of Federal Judicial Center projects.”
221
  Instead of formal 
empirical research, the Advisory Committee suggested that the public 
comment period on abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms should act as an 
indicator of the usage of the Forms.
222
  If the abrogation of Rule 84 and the 
Forms received a lot of attention and comments, then this would prove the 
Forms were used, according to the Advisory Committee.
223
   
During the public comment period, Rule 84 was published alongside 
                                                          
 214.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 42. 
 215.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 421–22. 
 216.   Id. at 422. 
 217.   Id. at 410 (“Many projects benefit from formal empirical research before going forward.  
The essentially uniform responses to informal inquiries by Subcommittee members, however, 
support the belief that there is little need to seek a place for Rule 84 [in a formal federal survey].”).   
 218.   Id.  The Rule 84 Subcommittee cites that an informal survey on usage of the Forms was 
conducted with the clerk’s offices in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona and the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, as well as with lawyers in Iowa.  Id. at 425.  The 
District of Arizona had used some of the Forms, including the Forms for summonses, waivers of 
service, judgment, and notice of magistrate judge availability.  Id.  The Northern District of Ohio 
used local forms and Administrative Office forms.  Id.  Beyond these three jurisdictions, there was 
no further inquiry other than a general reference to a survey of “some district clerks, pro se clerks, 
and others in like positions.”  Id.  It was never mentioned how many clerks were surveyed and where 
the clerks served. 
 219.   Id. at 425. 
 220.   Id.  
 221.   Id. at 410. 
 222.   Id. (“The public comment process is a reliable check.”). 
 223.   See id. 
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two major projects: Rule 37(e) regarding spoliation of electronically stored 
information and the Duke Rules Package amending Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 
31, 33, 34, and 37 to make the disposition of civil actions more efficient.
224
  
The Judicial Conference Committee cited that there was only one 
commenter who stated he or she “had ever actually used the Forms.”
225
  
There were 29 total comments on Rule 84 with some comments having 
multiple signers.
226
  Because of the limited, informal inquiries and the lack 
of response in the public comment period, the Advisory Committee 
concluded “there is little need to [keep] Rule 84.”
227
  The Advisory 
Committee inferred that lack of response to the abrogation proposal implied 
approval.
228
  The Advisory Committee, through their superficial inquiry, was 
convinced that its premonition that few used the Forms was correct. 
Fifth, the Advisory Committee cited alternative sources for forms as a 
reason to abrogate Rule 84.
229
  The alternative forms include forms created 
by private publishing companies and other non-pleading forms created and 
maintained by the Forms Working Group at the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.
230
  The Advisory Committee stated that abrogation 
would “open[] the way for continuing, prompt, and flexible development 
and dissemination of forms by the Administrative Office.”
231
  To address the 
concerns about national uniformity, the Advisory Committee suggested the 
Administrative Office coordinate with district clerks’ offices.
232
  The 
Advisory Committee claimed that practitioners use “their own forms, their 
firms’ forms, Administrative Office forms, local forms, forms provided by 
treatises, and forms from like sources” in lieu of the Official Forms.
233
  
However, the Advisory Committee failed to explain how outside third party 
forms help to address uniformity of access, substance, and usage in 
litigation.  Most importantly, the Advisory Committee failed to acknowledge 
that the unofficial forms are not authoritative by design like the Forms.
234
 
                                                          
 224.   May 2014 Standing Committee Meeting, supra note 9, at 63, 306. 
 225.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 94. 
 226.   May 2014 Standing Committee Meeting, supra note 9, at 421–25. 
 227.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 410. 
 228.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 94 (“The general lack of response to the Rule 
84 proposal reinforced the Committee’s view that the [F]orms are seldom used.”). 
 229.   Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, at 49. 
 230.   The Working Group at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts consists of 
six federal judges and six clerks of the court, and they, in consultation with various rules 
committees, create forms that can be downloaded online.  2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, 
at 93; see also supra note 146 (discussing the Administrative Office website and online forms). 
 231.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 412. 
 232.   Id. 
 233.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 42. 
 234.   Only the Official Forms are authoritative illustrations of sufficiency.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
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Sixth, according to the Advisory Committee, Rule 84 should be 
abrogated because “[t]he purpose of providing illustrations for the [R]ules, 
although useful when the [R]ules were adopted, has been fulfilled.”
235
  Part 
of the Forms’ purpose for adoption in 1938 was to support the change from 
code pleading.
236
  Rule 8 was a “cultural shift” to notice pleading, so the 
Forms were used to support the change.
237
  However, in modern litigation, 
many argue that the Forms are “no longer needed to encourage simple 
pleading.”
238
  The Advisory Committee stated lawyers “do not do Rule 8 
pleading, not before the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and not since.”
239
  
Many lawyers go beyond the minimum and support their claims with facts 
for advocacy purposes, according to the Advisory Committee.
240
  The 
Advisory Committee did not address the fact that there are a number of 
forms that act as illustrations of the Rules other than pleading, where 
illustrations are necessary and desirable for uniformity.
241
 
Seventh, the Advisory Committee acknowledged that Rule 84 ultimately 
has garnered attention primarily because of the difficulty in reconciling the 
pleading Forms and Twiqbal.
242
  The pleading Forms “embod[ied] stark 
illustrations of the ‘simplicity and brevity’ contemplated by the original 
proponents,” which has been “entrenched in practice.”
243
  According to the 
Advisory Committee, the Forms had led an “untroubled life” in practice, but 
Twiqbal demonstrated the Supreme Court’s “exposition of pleading 
standards inconsistent with the pleading [F]orms.”
244
  Twiqbal is an 
interpretation of Rule 8.
245
  Following Twiqbal, the Supreme Court stated 
the circumstances under which a court may dismiss a complaint as: 
“whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has stated a 
                                                          
84.  See also A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function 27 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper, Paper No. 2014-44, 2014), [hereinafter Spencer, The Forms] 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472083 (“[T]he principal function of the Official Forms throughout their 
history has been as an authoritative guarantor of a proper interpretation and application of the 
Federal Rules.”) (emphasis added).  
 235.   Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, at 49. 
 236.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 219; see also supra note 66 
(describing code pleading).  
 237.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 219; see also supra note 66 
(explaining notice pleading and code pleading). 
 238.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 219.   
 239.   Id. 
 240.   Id. 
 241.   See supra note 67 and accompanying text (providing examples of non-pleading Forms).   
 242.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 407.  
 243.   Id.  
 244.   Id.  
 245.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
683 (2009). 
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ground for relief that is plausible.”
246
  The Supreme Court also stated that 
although the court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 
complaint,” the rule is “inapplicable to legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.”
247
  Prior to Twiqbal, the standard for dismissal of 
a federal complaint was set forth in Conley v. Gibson, which stated “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
248
  Nevertheless, in Twombly, 
the Court made clear that Conley’s “no set of facts” language was abrogated 
and had “earned its retirement.”
249
 
Commentators following Twiqbal have argued that the plausibility 
pleading standard is an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) that 
heightens pleading standards to “frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid 
claims to get into court.”
250
  Commentators also noted that although the 
Supreme Court stated it is not “apply[ing] any ‘heightened’ pleading 
standard,”
251
 plausibility pleading “requires different levels of factual detail 
depending upon substantive context,” which ultimately makes the standard 
heightened and unclear.
252
  Thus, following all the criticism of Twiqbal, 




                                                          
 246.   Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added). 
 247.   Id. at 678. 
 248.   Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 249.   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63. 
 250.   See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431–33 (2008) 
[hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading] (“The Court’s new understanding of civil pleading 
obligations does not merely represent an insufficiently justified break with precedent and with the 
intent of the drafters of Rule 8.  It is motivated by policy concerns more properly vindicated through 
the rule amendment process, it places an undue burden on plaintiffs, and it will permit courts to 
throw out claims before they can determine their merit.  Ultimately, the imposition of plausibility 
pleading further contributes to the civil system’s long slide away from its original liberal ethos 
towards an ethos of restrictiveness more concerned with efficiency and judicial administration than 
with access to justice.”). 
 251.   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 469–70 n.14. 
 252.   See, e.g., Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 250, at 459. 
 253.   Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).  The bill’s stated purpose 
was: “To provide that Federal courts shall not dismiss complaints under [R]ule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).”  Id. (italics added).  The bill was ultimately 
never enacted.  Other proposals were made in various academic articles to avoid plausibility 
pleading.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 854–56 (2010) (“The first possibility would be to revise Rule 9 [for 
Pleading Special Matters] to include more classes of cases, while abrogating Twombly and Iqbal as a 
general rule. . . . A second, more elaborate way to preserve the new gatekeeping function in a fair 
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Twiqbal immediately drew attention to the Forms because the Forms 









  There was uncertainty 
about whether Twiqbal made the Forms obsolete, which led the Advisory 
Committee to consider all the broader questions about the necessity of the 
Forms.
258
  Although the Advisory Committee insists that the decision to 
abrogate did not rest on incompatibility with Twiqbal and should not bear on 
the pleading standards,
259
 the Twiqbal pleading standards were the catalyst 
for the Rule 84 discussion.
260
  Twiqbal was undoubtedly a major factor in 
the decision to abrogate, which sends an implicit message that the Forms 
simply are not consistent with the Twiqbal pleading standards. 
B. Abrogating Rule 84 is an Unwarranted and Implicit Endorsement of 
Twiqbal as a Heightened Pleading Standard Going Forward 
The first overarching reason cited for abrogation is the tension that 
exists between Twiqbal and the pleading Forms, which should not support 
abrogation upon further inquiry.
261
  Despite the Supreme Court never having 
found that the plausibility standard is incompatible with the Forms, 
262
 the 
                                                          
fashion . . . civil rulemakers might require as the price of admission to discovery—imposed if the 
opposing party has successfully met the standard for dismissal under Twombly-Iqbal—that the 
claimant demonstrate something like probable cause to believe that allowing discovery before 
dismissal would yield significant pertinent evidence.”); Michael C. Dorf, Should Congress Change 
the Standard for Dismissing a Federal Lawsuit?, FINDLAW (July 29, 2009), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090729.html (rejecting that the Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
as the best course of action).  Dorf suggested that the Congressional bill should instead read: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of enactment of this 
Act, a Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under [R]ule 8(a)(2) or [R]ule 
8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that such pleading is 
conclusory or implausible, except that a court may take judicial notice of the 
implausibility of a factual allegation.  So long as the pleaded claim or defense provides 
fair notice of the nature of the claim or defense, and the allegations, if taken to be true, 
would support a legally sufficient claim or defense, a pleading satisfies the requirements 
of [R]ule 8. 
Michael C. Dorf, An Alternative to Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Bill, DORF ON LAW (July 29, 
2009), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/07/alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html.  
 254.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10. 
 255.   FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 11, 12. 
 256.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 12. 
 257.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 12; Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 250, at 472.  
 258.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 223–24. 
 259.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 412. 
 260.   Id. 
 261.   See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 262.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 n.10 (2007).  
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Advisory Committee has come to its own implicit conclusion that Form 
pleading simply cannot exist post-Twiqbal.
263
  Each Committee in the Rules 
Enabling Process has disavowed any connection between Twiqbal and the 
abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, yet Twiqbal has always been at the 
forefront of the abrogation debate.
264
  Given the timing and amount of 
discussion surrounding Twiqbal during the Rules Enabling Process, it will 
be difficult to argue that the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms has 
nothing to do with Twiqbal, and therefore, this abrogation has no effect on 
the pleading standards.  Because Congress will most certainly not intervene 
to block the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, this abrogation would 
undoubtedly be an implicit endorsement of Twiqbal as a heightened pleading 
standard
265
 requiring greater particularity than the Forms provide going 
forward. 
Initially, the primary argument and the spark that started the abrogation 
discussion in 2009 in the Standing Committee and Advisory Committee was 
the alleged tension that exists between Twiqbal and the Forms.
266
  The 
discussion of abrogation of Rule 84 began in October 2009, which was only 
five months after the Supreme Court decided Iqbal.
267
  From the beginning 
of the process, the Advisory Committee itself noted the danger of abrogating 
Rule 84 for the stance it takes on Twiqbal.
268
  The Advisory Committee 
recognized that abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms would undoubtedly 
“generate a perception that the Forms were being abrogated because the 
pleading forms, sufficient under notice pleading as it had been understood 
up to 2007, no longer suffice under Twombly and Iqbal.”
269
  Even if this was 
factually incorrect and the Forms are in fact intended to be sufficient, the 
Advisory Committee noted that nothing could defeat the perception that 
inconsistency with Twiqbal was the reason for abrogation.
270
  The Advisory 
                                                          
 263.   See November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 407 (detailing the 
Forms’ existence following the decisions in Twiqbal). 
 264.   See supra notes 242–60 and accompanying text (discussing Twiqbal as a reason favoring 
abrogation). 
 265.   The Supreme Court held in Twombly that pleading “do[es] not require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
 266.   Minutes of Civil Rules Advisory Committee, U.S. COURTS 14–16 (Oct. 8-9, 2009) 
[hereinafter October 2009 Advisory Committee Meeting], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV10-2009-min.pdf. 
 267.   Iqbal was decided in May 2009.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  The initial 
meeting discussing Rule 84 was held in October 2009.  See October 2009 Advisory Committee 
Meeting, supra note 266, at 16. 
 268.   Id.  
 269.   Id. (noting that the implication that abrogation was because the Forms were no longer 
sufficient immediately following Twiqbal was a “serious reason to hold off”). 
 270.   Id. 
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Committee even reached the conclusion that Congress might feel the need to 
intervene and pass legislation to re-institute notice pleading if passed when 
the Advisory Committee first considered abrogating Rule 84.
271
 
Even during 2013, almost four years after discussions of abrogation first 
began, the implied endorsement of Twiqbal as a heightened standard as a 
result of abrogation continued to be a point of concern.
272
  The Rule 84 
Subcommittee sought legal counsel to conduct extensive research on the 
validity of the Forms under Twiqbal.
273
  Further, during an Advisory 
Committee meeting in 2013, members again expressed concern that 
abandoning the Forms even four years after Twiqbal might be too rushed 
and an unwarranted decision that the Forms are inconsistent with Twiqbal.
274
  
Thus, the Advisory Committee predicted that the abrogation of Rule 84 
would “reflect[] a judgment that [the Forms] departed from the original 
meaning of Rule 8.”
275
  If Form pleading does not meet the standards of 
Rule 8(a)(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Twiqbal, then this 




In response to the apprehension that the abrogation was taking a 
particular stance on Twiqbal, the Advisory Committee suggested that the 
concern could be dispelled with a clear explanation that Rule 84 and the 
Forms are being abandoned for other reasons—particularly that the Forms 
are no longer used in modern litigation.
277
  However, the Advisory 
Committee in a memorandum submitted to the Judicial Conference, 
Standing Committee, and Supreme Court only said that it would “continue[] 
to review the effects of [Twiqbal].”
278
  With the memorandum, the proposed 
amendments included an Advisory Committee Note that did not mention 
                                                          
 271.   Id. (“It is even possible that Congress might take proposed abrogation as a sign that 
legislation is needed to revivify notice pleading.”).  Legislation was presented to re-implement 
notice pleading in 2009, which was never enacted.  See supra note 253 (describing the Notice 
Pleading Restoration Act).  
 272.   See April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 229–47. 
 273.   Id. at 229–47.  See discussion infra Part III.C.3 (describing the findings of legal counsel 
commissioned by Rule 84 Subcommittee on the validity of the Forms and Twiqbal). 
 274.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 219 (“Concern was 
expressed . . . that abandoning the forms might seem an implied rebuke of the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions, reflecting a judgment that they departed from the original meaning of Rule 8.”). 
 275.   Id. 
 276.   Coleman, supra note 75, at 18 (“With Rule 8, it provides the baseline for pleading 
doctrine.  If Form 11 is eliminated, Rule 8 will have necessarily been changed.”) 
 277.   See 2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16; but see October 2009 Advisory 
Committee Meeting, supra note 266, at 16 (explaining that nothing could defeat the perception that 
inconsistency with Twiqbal was the reason for abrogation). 
 278.   Id. at 94. 
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pleading standards at all.
279
  When the abrogation of Rule 84 (including the 
Advisory Committee Note) was submitted to the Supreme Court, the 
suggestion of the Advisory Committee to make it clear that Rule 84 is being 
abrogated for reasons other than to endorse Twiqbal as a heightened 
pleading standard was ignored.
280
 
It was only upon the Supreme Court’s request in April 2015, when Rule 
84 and the Forms had almost completed the Rules Enabling Act process, that 
the Advisory Committee included in the Advisory Committee Note to the 
proposed abrogation that “abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing 
pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.”
281
  
However, arguably, even if it is strenuously and explicitly claimed that 
abrogation of Rule 84 does not imply any position on the sufficiency of the 
Forms under Twiqbal, there is still likely an implicit endorsement of a 
heightened pleading standard given how much of the debate has surrounded 
Twiqbal.  Given the mixed messages sent throughout the Rules Enabling Act 
process regarding reconciliation of Twiqbal and the pleading Forms, the 
minimal coverage of the pleading standards in the Advisory Committee Note 
will not likely be enough to overcome the statement abrogation is making on 
pleading. 
Legal academics from around the country have also recognized the 
danger of abrogating Rule 84 because it would essentially be blessing the 
pleading standard in Twiqbal as heightened without writing and passing an 
amended Rule as required in the Rules Enabling Act process.
282
  During the 
public comment period in August 2013 on the possible abrogation of Rule 
84 and the Forms, a number of law professors submitted comments opposing 
the abrogation.
283
  The academic community expressed concern that 
publishing a proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms did not satisfy the 
Rules Enabling Act process.
284
  The scholars explained, 
[S]triking the Form Complaints commits the Committee to a position 
                                                          
 279.   Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, at 49; see also 2014 Judicial Conference, 
supra note 10, at 143. 
 280.   2015 Rules Package, supra note 178, at 132, 139. 
 281.   2015 Rules Package, supra note 178, at 132, 139. 
 282.   See, e.g., Letter from Helen Hershkoff, Lonny Hoffman, Alexander Reinert, Elizabeth 
Schneider, David Shapiro, and Adam Steinman, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Scholar Letter], http://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Professors-Joint-Comment.pdf (signed also by Letter from 171 Law 
Professors, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 18, 2014) http://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/FRCP-letter-with-signatures.pdf); Coleman, supra note 75, at 1; Spencer, 
The Forms, supra note 234, at 26. 
 283.   Scholar Letter, supra note 282, at 16. 
 284.   Id.  See also Coleman, supra note 75, at 12–18. 
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that implicitly adopts plausibility pleading as the standard going 
forward.  This is all the more troubling given that one trenchant 
criticism of Iqbal and Twombly is that the Court abandoned its 
previously stated commitment to modifying the Federal Rules through 
the rulemaking process rather than through case adjudication.
285
 
If the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms made it through the Rules 
Enabling Process, the scholars were concerned that “the door [to debating on 
the pleading standards] [would] be effectively shut and the pleading rules 
will have been altered without any of the participatory deliberation that 
legitimizes the Federal Rules.”
286
  In response to the concerns of the 
academic community about the abrogation of the Forms also requiring 
amendment to the Rule it illustrates, the Advisory Committee merely stated 
it “considered this perspective but unanimously determined that the 
publication process and the opportunity to comment on the proposal fully 
satisfie[d] the Rules Enabling Act.”
287
  However, the Advisory Committee 
never explicitly responded to and explained whether this was in fact the 
endorsement of Twiqbal as a heightened pleading standard that would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act process as the academic community claimed 
beyond the conclusory statement that the concern had been addressed and 
the Rules Enabling Act satisfied.
288
 
Despite the various Committees’ claims that the Forms constrain 
plausibility pleading and should be abrogated for that reason, there is no 
evidence that Twiqbal plausibility pleading has had a great impact on 
pleading practice up to this point.
289
  The Forms are not actually causing the 
pressing conflict the Advisory Committee cited as a main reason for 
abrogation,
290
 which makes abrogation truly unwarranted.  Recent studies 
analyzing the rates at which motions to dismiss have been granted have 
indicated that plausibility pleading has not taken a dramatic departure from 
the days of notice pleading.
291
 
According to a Federal Judicial Center report, judges are not deciding 
motions to dismiss differently than they would have in the pre-Twiqbal 
era.
292
  Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in 2009–10 (post-
                                                          
 285.   Scholar Letter, supra note 282, at 16. 
 286.   Id. 
 287.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16.  
 288.   See id. at 17. 
 289.   See Alex D. Silagi, Comment, Keep Calm and Plead On: Why New Empirical Evidence 
Should Temper Fears About Plausibility Pleading, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 247, 274 (2014). 
 290.   See id. 
 291.   Id. 
 292.   Id. at 265 (citing Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After 
Iqbal: Report to Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 8 (2011), 
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Twiqbal) were filed in 6.2% of all cases in the federal courts, which was 
2.2% over the filing rate for such motions in cases in 2005–06 (pre-
Twiqbal).
293
  There was no increase in the rate of grants of motions to 
dismiss without leave to amend during that time period despite the increased 
filing of motions to dismiss.
294
  Courts have found most modern pleading 
complies with Twiqbal based on the Rules, the Forms, and pre-Twiqbal case 
law.
295
  Thus, any changes up to this point have been incremental at best, 




The statistics suggest that there is not necessarily a pressing need for the 
Advisory Committee to intervene to decide how to reconcile Twiqbal with 
the Forms.
297
  Despite the Advisory Committee Note stating that the 
abrogation of Rule 84 was not to have an effect on the pleading standards,
298
 
the Advisory Committee should ultimately be concerned that, by making a 
break with the Forms, it is still sending an unjustified message that Twiqbal 
plausibility pleading is incompatible with the Forms.  This heightens the 
plausibility pleading standard to something more than what is illustrated in 
the Forms going forward.  What seems like a small shift could have a 
particularly unsettling effect on the courts and the litigants; abrogation may 
result in an unwarranted denial of access to the courts because losing the 
Forms implicitly heightens the pleading standards to a greater, but still 
indeterminable level.  The Forms not being squared with Twiqbal is an open 
question and given the statistics provided by the Federal Judicial Center,
299
 
abrogation prematurely addresses conflict where none may exist.  The best 
and only solution to not implicitly heighten the pleading standards is to keep 
Rule 84 and the Forms during the transition into Twiqbal pleading. 
By choosing to take an implicit stance on the pleading standards through 
abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, there is no true resolution to the 
alleged uncertainty and tension in Twiqbal pleading.  Arguably, the choice to 
abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms leaves only further room for ambiguity in 
                                                          
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf). 
 293.   Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to 
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 8 (2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. 
 294.   Id. at 13. 
 295.   Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1323 (2010) (“The 
upshot is that lower courts have, essentially, a duty to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with pre-
Twombly case law.”). 
 296.   Silagi, supra note 289, at 275. 
 297.   See discussion supra notes 289–96 and accompanying text. 
 298.   2015 Rules Package, supra note 178, at 132, 139. 
 299.   See discussion supra notes 289–96.  
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the already unclear Twiqbal pleading standards.  The Advisory Committee 
stated that a primary benefit of deleting the Forms is that it would “leave[] 
the courts free to draw from the experience of hundreds of thousands of 
cases in tailoring pleading standards for all categories of claims.  The lessons 
of the past will not be lost in this process, but [the Forms] will no longer 
impose awkward constraints.”
300
  However, with the Forms gone, now there 
will no longer be the uniform guidance on sufficiency that the Forms have 
provided during the plausibility pleading transition.  Judges now may merely 
infer from the abrogation of Rule 84 that Twiqbal requires something more 
than the Forms illustrate, which will likely lead to hundreds of different 
interpretations of what is sufficient pleading.  Given that the pleading 
standard can be outcome-determinative for some litigants, it seems 
imperative to have guidance on sufficiency when pleading instead of leaving 
sufficiency open to varying interpretations.  With the Forms gone, there no 
longer will be uniform guidance on sufficiency. 
Instead of the Forms “impos[ing] awkward constraints [on pleading],”
301
 
perhaps it is the subjectivity and lack of clarity of Twiqbal that is causing 
awkward constraints on the pleading standards—thus, the Forms are not the 
issue.  Considering academics, practitioners, and even the Advisory and 
Standing Committees have recognized that the decision to abrogate the 
Forms and Rule 84 truly centers on Twiqbal, there is no way to avoid the 
implicit statement abrogation makes about Twiqbal as a heightened pleading 
standard.
302
  Instead of taking an explicit stance on Twiqbal and deciding 
what it takes to comply with the standard, the Advisory Committee and 
Standing Committee are dodging the true debate on what Twiqbal requires 
while implicitly controlling Twiqbal’s direction.  Abrogation takes a stance 
on Twiqbal requiring something greater than the Form complaints provide 
going forward, but it only leads to further confusion on how much more is 
needed. 
C. The Courts, Practitioners, and Pro Se Litigants All Benefit From Use 
of the Forms as Authoritative Illustrations and Without Them, the 
Meaning and Interpretation of the Rules Will Become More Unclear 
The second overarching reason for abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms 
is that they are not useful in modern litigation based on the Committees’ 
arguments of the Forms being out of date, the Forms requiring too many 
                                                          
 300.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 412. 
 301.   Id.  
 302.   See supra notes 242–57 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning for abrogation 
truly centering on the incompatibility with Twiqbal). 
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resources to amend, pro se litigants and practitioners rarely using the Forms, 
the availability of alternative Forms, and the purpose of the Forms having 
been fulfilled.
303
  This reason also does not support abrogation upon further 
scrutiny.  After seventy-six years of operation alongside the Rules, the 
Forms have become an important guarantor of the Rules for different 
members of the legal community.
304
  The Forms have been authoritative 
examples used both as an illustration of compliance during drafting and a 
point of argument to verify compliance for litigants who are challenged on 
non-compliance with the requirements of the Rules.
305
  With the Forms 
abrogated, the three primary groups that will be negatively impacted are: 
practitioners, pro se litigants, and judges. Abrogation of Rule 84 and the 
Forms will only benefit the Advisory Committee and the Standing 
Committee who will no longer have the responsibility to maintain the 
Forms. 
1.  Practitioners 
Practitioners are the first group negatively impacted by the abrogation of 
Rule 84 and the Forms.  The Advisory Committee has maintained 
throughout the Rule 84 abrogation debate that practitioners rarely use the 
Forms.
306
  The Rule 84 Subcommittee based this generalized conclusion on 
a canvassed group of unknown “law firms, public interest law offices, and 
individual lawyers.”
307
  This limited inquiry satisfied both the Rule 84 
Subcommittee and the Advisory Committee that practitioners do not use the 
Forms, which “confirmed the initial impressions of Subcommittee 
members.”
308
  In the Advisory Committee’s report to the Judicial 
Conference recommending abrogation, it concluded that the Form 
complaints embrace too few causes of actions and illustrate too simple of 
pleading to be useful to practitioners in modern times given the increased 
“use of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss” and “the enhanced pleading 
                                                          
 303.   See supra Part III.A. (describing the reasoning for abrogation).  
 304.   See Spencer, The Forms, supra note 234, at 26. 
 305.   See id. 
 306.   See supra text accompanying notes 211–28 (explaining the information collected about 
practitioner use by the Rule 84 Subcommittee and the Advisory Committee); 2014 Judicial 
Conference, supra note 10, at 94. 
 307.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 93.  It is vague as to who was included in this 
survey.  There is little indication how many people were surveyed, from what areas of the country, 
and from what areas of practice.  See id. 
 308.   Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil 
Procedure, U.S. COURTS 276 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Published_Rules_Package.pdf.  
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requirements of Rule 9 and some federal statutes.”
309
  The complexity of 
modern litigation has “resulted in a detailed level of pleading that is far 
beyond that illustrated in the [F]orms,” according to the Advisory 
Committee.
310
  However, these arguments ignore a possible use of the Forms 
by practitioners.  While the Forms can be drafting tools for new lawyers or 
pro se litigants, the Forms can also be a verification tool for all practitioners 
in more complex causes of action.
311
  The Forms serve a dual purpose: they 




Practitioners do not have to first use the Forms when drafting to later 
use them when arguing sufficiency under the Rules.
313
  As previously noted, 
most practitioners in modern litigation use factual detail that goes beyond 
the Forms,
314
 so drafting a complaint based on the illustrations in the Forms 
may not be the most important use for the Forms in modern litigation.  The 
Forms were never meant to be an all-encompassing example of every cause 
of action and new federal statute in existence, which is a task better left to 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or local rules that may 
go through a quicker amendment process.
315
  The Advisory Committee had 
already considered appending a practice manual to the Rules and explicitly 
rejected it in 1989 because it was not allowed under the Rules Enabling Act 
and did not serve the purpose of the Forms.
316
  The Forms are intended to be 
illustrations of sufficiency—not a manual of forms like what is put out by 
local courts or the Administrative Office of the United States Courts where 
the drafter must just fill in the blank.
317
 
                                                          
 309.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 93. 
 310.   Id. 
 311.   See Spencer, The Forms, supra note 234, at 25 (“[Litigants] certainly use [the Forms] to 
make arguments about the Rules and what they require.  To the point that litigants do not use the 
forms as the model for their pleadings, such is not the purpose of the Official Forms.”). 
 312.   See id. at 11–12. 
 313.   See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text (explaining that many lawyers go beyond 
the minimum and support their claims with facts for advocacy purposes according to the Advisory 
Committee). 
 314.   See id. 
 315.   The former introductory statement to the Forms stated that the Forms were never intended 
to be a manual of Forms.  FED. R. CIV. P. app. of forms introductory statement (1946) (repealed Dec. 
1, 2007); see also Spencer, The Forms, supra note 234, at 26.  
 316.   See supra notes 32–36, 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing the 1989 proposed 
amendment that would have substituted a practice manual for the Appendix of Forms.  It was 
proposed that the Judicial Conference could amend the practice manual without the formalities of the 
Rules Enabling Act process.). 
 317.   FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption (“In accordance with the 
practice found useful in many codes, provision is here made for a limited number of official [F]orms 
which may serve as guides in pleading.”). 
362 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
The Forms should be used to show the amount of factual detail to 
include for sufficiency but not necessarily the substantive composition 
thereof.  If challenged, practitioners can point to the Forms to show 
substantial compliance with the sufficiency the Form required even if it is 
not the exact cause of action or federal statute the Form is illustrating.  For 
example, Form 11, which is a complaint for negligence, contains the simple 
statement: “[D]efendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the 
plaintiff.”
318
  Form 11 does not require parsing the negligence allegations 
into separate elements.
319
  Thus, Form 11 could be used to show the 
sufficiency of a claim for misrepresentation where the complaint merely 
states that “the supposed misrepresentations were made ‘in connection with 
a transaction . . . in which the . . . [defendant] had a pecuniary interest.’”
320
  
The level of factual detail and particularity of Form 11 can be paralleled for 
other causes of action. 
Similarly, a party may challenge based on substantial non-compliance 
with the Forms.  For example, Form 6, which is a waiver of the service of 
summons, requires the date, the name of the plaintiff’s attorney, and the 
signature of the attorney.
321
  Where the attorney does not provide the date or 
his or her signature, the defendant could argue that the plaintiff failed to 
comply with Rule 4(d)(1), which is the rule for waiving service, based on 
Form 6.
322
  Conversely, if the defendant were to argue the plaintiff failed to 
comply with Rule 4(d)(1) because the plaintiff failed to include an expected 
return date on the waiver form, Form 6 could be used to show that nowhere 
is there a place to fill in a required return date and therefore, it is not 
required by the Rule.
323
  Because this important purpose of the Forms still 
exists in modern litigation, modernized Forms could undoubtedly be 
extremely beneficial to practitioners if challenged on sufficiency under the 
Rules.  The Advisory Committee used a very limited and narrow view of the 
purpose of the Forms to conclude that practitioners do not have a use for the 
Forms, so it hardly seems that this argument should hold weight when the 
purpose of the Forms is viewed more broadly. 
                                                          
 318.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 319.   Id. 
 320.   Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s complaint alleging negligent misrepresentations contained minimal factual particularity, 
but its allegations were at least as detailed as those found in Form 9 or now Form 11 for negligence).  
 321.   FED. R. CIV. P. Form 6. 
 322.   FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). 
 323.   See AIRFX.com v. AirFX LLC, No. CV 11-01064-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 5007919, at *5 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 2011).  
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2.  Pro Se Litigants 
Pro se litigants are the second group that will likely be affected by the 
loss of the Forms.  The Rule 84 Subcommittee reported that there is “little 
indication that pro se parties often find the Forms, much less use them.”
324
  
It was suggested that courts instead develop local forms for common types 
of litigation for pro se litigants.
325
  The Forms have furthered the purpose of 
the Rules to secure better access to the courts for pro se litigants by making 
uniform illustrations of what pleadings suffice to withstand attack under the 
Rules,
326
 which local forms cannot guarantee.  Given the volume of pro se 
litigation in the federal courts,
327
 one would assume forms with guaranteed 
authority would be extremely important given pro se litigants are often 
without sufficient legal training.
328
 
The critique that pro se litigants do not know where to find the Forms or 
how to use the Forms also seems to be unfounded given that courts have 
recommended the Forms to pro se litigants before.
329
  While the Committee 
has noted that pro se litigants do not likely know where to find the Forms 
and much less how to use them, the suggested alternative was to use the 
forms supplied by the local rules of each court or the Administrative Office 
                                                          
 324.   There is no real indication where the committee gathered such information.  See 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. COURTS 270 (Jan. 3–4, 2013) [hereinafter 
January 2013 Standing Committee Meeting], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2013-
01.pdf. 
 325.   Id. 
 326.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (“The [F]orms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and 
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”); November 2012 Advisory 
Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408, 412 (“[T]he [F]orms might be useful for someone . . . 
particularly pro se litigants. . . . Many of [the Forms] address topics where uniformity is useful.”). 
 327.   The United States Courts releases a statistical analysis of historical caseload for the federal 
judiciary.  Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 30, 2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2012/Table204.pdf.  The 
United States Courts of Appeals listed that the total number of appeals in 2012 was 57,501.  Id.  Of 
the 57,501 total appeals, there were 29,075 pro se cases filed with the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Id.  
Of the 29,075 pro se cases filed, there were 19,028 total civil appeals.  Id.  
 328.   For instance, it would likely be helpful for pro se litigants to know the pleading standards 
of the courts as illustrated in Form 11 or how to summon the defendant as illustrated in Form 3.  
 329.   See, e.g., Gharbi v. Flagstar, No. A-10-CA-382 LY, 2012 WL 716150, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 5, 2012) (recommending to a pro se litigant that “[f]or examples of how to write a complaint, 
Plaintiffs should review the form complaints available in the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”); Weymouth v. Ariz. Dep’t of Liquor Licenses & Control, No. CV-12-979-PHX-GMS, 
2012 WL 4359073, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2012) (telling the Weymouths, pro se litigants, that “[i]n 
preparing an amended complaint, the Weymouths should consult Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84  
and the ‘Appendix of Forms’ referenced therein because such forms ‘are sufficient under the rules 
and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate’”).   
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of the United States Courts.
330
  There is absolutely no indication, other than 
through assumptions made by the Advisory Committee,
331
 that pro se 
litigants are more likely to find and use the forms supplied by the local rules 
of each court or the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  
Because pro se litigants are required to comply with the Rules,
332
 it hardly 
seems possible that they could not find the Forms in the Appendix. 
The other issue of recommending unofficial forms to pro se litigants is 
that they do not serve the same purpose as the Forms because litigants do not 
have the guarantee that such forms will be sufficient to withstand attack 
under the Rules.
333
  Rather than having unofficial forms from local courts or 
the Administrative Office, it seems more likely that a uniform, streamlined 
version of forms in a uniform location used throughout the federal court 
system, like those found in the Rules currently, would best serve pro se 
litigants.  Without the Forms, it will likely hinder access for pro se litigants 
to the courts as early as the pleading stage. 
3.  The Federal Courts 
Along with practitioners and pro se litigants losing authoritative 
illustrations of the Rules, the bench will have to grapple with seventy-six 
years of case law on the Forms and Rule 84.  With the abrogation of the 
Forms and Rule 84, case law approving the Forms could linger and lead to 
confusion in the judiciary based on the plan to continue substantially similar 
forms through the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  When 
the Advisory Committee and the Rule 84 Subcommittee first considered 
abrogation, the Subcommittee members elected to have the chief counsel for 
the Standing Committee research whether the Forms’ case law would have 
any lingering effects with Rule 84 abrogated.
334
  Even in light of Twiqbal, 
the majority of courts have chosen to view the Forms as sufficient under the 
rules throughout the last seventy-six years.
335
 
The Rule 84 Subcommittee researched case law on courts that continued 
                                                          
 330.   January 2013 Standing Committee Meeting, supra note 324, at 270. 
 331.   The Advisory Committee noted the “courts are making attempts to aid pro se litigants by 
developing local forms for common types of litigation . . . .”  Id.  
 332.   See, e.g., Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that pro se 
litigants are “subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the [Rules]”).  
 333.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408 (“The Administrative 
Office has prepared some civil forms that are available on the web site and easily downloaded for 
use.”). 
 334.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 223. 
 335.   Id. at 223–24.  See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing the different approaches courts 
have taken in harmonizing Twiqbal and the pleading Forms). 
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to follow precedent developed under abrogated or amended rules to 
determine whether Rule 84 and the Forms case law would be affected by 
past abrogation.
336
  Based on the treatment of other abrogated and amended 
Rules, the Rule 84 Subcommittee concluded that the Forms and Rule 84 case 
law would not likely have validity following abrogation because “courts 
generally look[ed] at the amended [R]ule going forward and do not rely on 
case law under previous versions of the [R]ule.”
337
  The case law on the 
Forms tended to rely on Rule 84 for authority as to the Form’s 
sufficiency.
338
  Once Rule 84 was no longer in place, the Subcommittee 
concluded it was unlikely the Forms would suffice.
339
  This conclusion was 
based on an examination of “not much case law” that rejected precedent 
under abrogated or amended Rules, including references to abrogated rules 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
340
 
However, the legal counsel used by the Subcommittee gave the example 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b), where the court continued 
following precedent after abrogation.  Rule 43(b) prior to abrogation stated 
“[a] party may call an adverse party . . . and interrogate him by leading 
questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been 
called by the adverse party . . . .”
341
  However, when the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were enacted in 1975, Rule 43(b) was abrogated and subsumed 
into the Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 607, 611(b) and 611(c).
342
  Courts 
                                                          
 336.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 224. 
 337.   Id.  The Subcommittee concluded that “where rules have been abrogated, courts will 
decline to look to case law under the abrogated rule.”  Id. at 225.  The only two situations where the 
court continued using case law for an abrogated rule were Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b) and 
73(d).  Id. at 226–29.   
 338.   Id.   
 339.   Id. at 224 n.1.   
 340.   Id. at 224–25.  The Subcommittee cited the following in favor of the proposition that once 
a procedural rule is abrogated or amended the case law no longer has effect: Talbot v. Vill. of Sauk 
Vill., No. 97 C 2281, 1999 WL 286089, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1999) (rejecting a party’s 
suggestion to look at cases under abrogated Rule 43(b), which had been superseded by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 611(c), because the Civil Rule had “no current force”); Yost v. Stout, 607 F.3d 1239, 
1244 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to rely on precedent because it had been abrogated by revisions 
to the federal rules); United States v. Rowe, 92 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the denial of 
pretrial motion for leave to impeach a witness allowed by precedent, but no longer allowed under 
express abrogation by 1990 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Young, 
14 F.R.D. 406, 407 (D.D.C. 1953), rev’d, 214 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (“Even if, prior to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, . . . there existed a common law rule or a 
statutory provision that the name of the person who administered the oath must be stated in an 
indictment for perjury —which we do not decide,— this requirement must be deemed to have been 
abrogated by the new Rules.”).  April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 225–26.   
 341.   Id. at 226 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 43(b) (1938) (abrogated 1975)).  
 342.   Id. (quoting Patrick v. City of Detroit, 906 F.2d 1108, 1113 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
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followed Rule 43(b) precedent because the right continued to exist.
343
 
Even if the Forms are abrogated, like Rule 43(b) that continued to exist 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence following abrogation, the Forms could 
have a life in the common law to the extent the Forms or something 
substantially similar continue through the Administrative Office forms as the 
Standing Committee’s note in the proposed amendment endorses.
344
  Thus, 
this may lead to the Forms having at the very least persuasive authority as to 
the meaning of the Rules in some jurisdictions.  The Rule 84 Subcommittee 
itself recognized that if the Forms are “still made available through the 
Administrative Office or otherwise, courts may find them persuasive, even if 
not bound to find that conforming pleadings suffice.”
345
  To the extent that 
the Forms will still be available through the Administrative Office, it seems 
likely this will lead to tension for the judiciary of whether to recognize the 
Forms as persuasive or ignore the existing case law from the last seventy-six 
years completely.  Because at least arguably abrogation will heighten the 
pleading standards under Twiqbal,
346
 different courts are free to adopt 
different opinions on whether the Forms still garner any authority.  This can 
only lead to further uncertainty in the already foggy Twiqbal plausibility 
pleading. 
In addition to uncertainty in case law, judges will no longer have the 
Forms as a guaranteed illustration of sufficiency for non-compliant parties.  
Judges have often used the Forms for issues of non-compliance much like 
the parties—as a measure of what is expected under the Rules.
347
  In the 
context of pleading, as stated in Iqbal, judges are charged with 
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 
[which] will, . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
348
  Thus, judges have 
looked to the Forms to read and interpret the expectations of Twiqbal. 
For example, the Seventh Circuit relied on Form 9 (now Form 11) in 
Tamayo v. Blagojevich
349
 to determine whether plaintiff’s allegation of 
sexual discrimination had met Twiqbal.  In Tamayo, guided by Twombly’s 
                                                          
 343.   Id. at 227 (quoting Patrick, 906 F.2d at 1113). 
 344.   Proposed Amendments 2014–2015, supra note 6, at 49–50 (“Accordingly, recognizing that 
there are many excellent alternative sources for forms, including the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer necessary and have been 
abrogated.”). 
 345.   April 2013 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 174, at 224 n.1. 
 346.   See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 347.   See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 103–112 (including examples of cases where 
practitioners and the judge use the Forms as a metric for sufficiency).   
 348.   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).   
 349.   Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008).   
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explicit praise of Form 9 (now Form 11),
350
 the Seventh Circuit recognized 
that a complaint of negligence needed to be in compliance with Form 9.
351
  
Form 9 states the defendant on a specific date “negligently drove a motor 
vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing [an identified] highway.”
352
  
Thus, in order to survive dismissal at the pleading stage, it is required that 
plaintiffs allege negligence.
353
  It is not required that the party state the ways 
in which the defendant was negligent, like drunk driving or driving too fast, 
because this information was beyond what was required at the pleading 
stage.
354
  Upon a mere allegation of negligence, the “defendant [has] 
sufficient notice to enable him to begin to investigate and prepare a 
defense.”
355
  The Seventh Circuit in Tamayo used the Form for negligence as 
a metric to determine if the plaintiff had enough facts in support of her 
sexual discrimination claim to be sufficient.
356
  In Tamayo, plaintiff’s claim 
of sexual discrimination avoided dismissal at the pleading stage of the 
proceeding because plaintiff alleged she was a female and she was paid less 
than other similarly situated males.
357
  The court found that these allegations 
were sufficient with the requirements of Form 9 in mind.
358
  It was never 
alleged that the plaintiff had drafted the complaint based on the Forms, but 
the Seventh Circuit chose to use Form 9 as a metric of sufficiency.
359
  Thus, 
as judges are now charged with determining how to read Twiqbal, judges 
often use the Forms as metrics of sufficiency.  With the Forms gone, judges 
will no longer have the Forms as a valuable tool. 
D. Rule 84 and the Official Forms Should Be Modified Instead of 
Abrogated to Continue to Serve as Authoritative Illustrations of 
Sufficiency Under the Rules 
The Forms coming into compliance with Twiqbal and modern litigation 
needs will be the most valuable option to address Rule 84 and the Forms in 
the long term for both the bench and the bar even though it will be the most 
                                                          
 350.   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (noting that the pleading was 
insufficient for not mentioning the time, place or person involved in the alleged conspiracy in sharp 
contrast with the model form for pleading negligence, Form 9).   
 351.   Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084.   
 352.   Id. at 1084 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576); see also FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 353.   Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084–85. 
 354.   Id. 
 355.   Id. at 1085 (noting this may not be true for more complicated causes of actions like RICO 
violations).  
 356.   See id. at 1084. 
 357.   Id. at 1085. 
 358.   Id. at 1084–85. 
 359.   See id. 
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burdensome alternative.  When it is considered that the Forms themselves 
are authoritative by design, it becomes clear that the Forms cannot be 
permitted to remain in neglect given the needs of modern litigation and the 
Rules themselves, particularly in the pleading context.  The options to 
address the tension are: (1) to ignore the Forms and allow the Twiqbal 
standard to render them insufficient, (2) allow the Forms to stay as they are 
and remain sufficient, (3) abolish the Forms entirely, or (4) have the Forms 
come into compliance with modern litigation. 
While abrogation of the Forms may be the easiest and simplest way to 
address any tension in the pleading standards and the Forms, it does not 
solve the root of the problem, which is that plausibility pleading is still as 
unclear as it was in 2009 when abrogation was first considered.  Starting as 
early as 2009, the Advisory Committee recognized that “[a]ttempting to 
frame pleading forms while pleading standards remain in flux could be 
difficult.”
360
  The Advisory Committee in 2009 elected to put off a decision 
on abrogation until the pleading standards had taken a more concrete 
direction nationwide.
361
  Yet, even six years later in 2015, the same 
uncertainty exists as to the Twiqbal plausibility standards as enunciated by 
the Advisory Committee in 2009.  The Advisory Committee in a 2014 report 
to the Judicial Conference stated only that it “continue[s] to review the 
effects of Twombly and Iqbal” in the official recommendation to abrogate 
Rule 84 and the Forms.
362
  Further, in the Rule 84 Advisory Committee Note 
approved by the Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and the Supreme 
Court during the Rules Enabling Act process, the only guidance provided on 
pleading was that Rule 84’s abrogation was not meant to have any effect on 
the pleading standards.
363
  There still seems to be no coherent explanation of 
sufficiency under Twiqbal, and the tactic to address it seems to be 
avoidance. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding pleading, there is no better time to 
have an illustration of sufficiency in the Rules.  When the Forms were 
initially adopted in 1938, they were intended to serve as illustrations to help 
calm uncertainty surrounding the new Rules.
364
  Like in 1938, the Forms 
could serve in modern times as an illustration to help alleviate uncertainty 
                                                          
 360.   October 2009 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 266, at 14. 
 361.   Id. at 16 (“But publication so soon would generate a perception that the Forms were being 
abrogated because the pleading forms, sufficient under notice pleading as it had been understood up 
to 2007, no longer suffice under Twombly and Iqbal.  That is a serious reason to hold off.  Nothing 
the Committee can say would defeat the perception.”).  
 362.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 94. 
 363.   2015 Rules Package, supra note 178, at 132, 139. 
 364.   Clark, supra note 58, at 181.  See supra note 66 (describing the transition from code 
pleading to notice pleading). 
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surrounding the expectations of Twiqbal.  The Advisory Committee has 
noted throughout the debate on whether to abrogate that the Rules are no 
longer in their “infancy” and are sufficiently developed that illustrations are 
no longer necessary to alleviate uncertainty.
365
  Because the Rules are 
constantly being amended by the Advisory Committee and interpreted by the 
federal courts, it seems highly unlikely that a rule could reach such a level of 
maturity that it simply outgrows the need for illustration.  Illustrations of the 
changes are arguably the best way to communicate the expectations and 
interpretations of amendments to the Rules.  Given the split in the circuits on 
harmonizing Twiqbal plausibility pleading with the Forms, the ability to 
illustrate sufficiency of pleading in particular is more important than it 
perhaps has ever been before.
366
 
As the lack of modification in the more recent history of the Forms has 
come to the forefront in the Rule 84 and Forms abrogation debate, this is an 
opportunity to address the concern that there is no efficient way to ensure the 
Forms are in compliance with the Rules and modern litigation.  Instead of 
deciding to abrogate because of the difficulty in amending through the Rules 
Enabling process and the increased workload to the Advisory Committee,
367
 
there can simply be a different process for creating and maintaining the 
Forms.  One way modification of the Forms could be done is through a 
semi-permanent subcommittee chosen by the Advisory Committee.  This 
addresses the concern that delegating to the Administrative Office, which the 
Advisory Committee has no power over, would violate the Rules Enabling 
process.  This could be seen as a chance for groups of lawyers on all sides of 
litigation to create Forms that reflect shared needs.  The subcommittee could 
be in charge of determining if the Rules could benefit from having a Form 
for illustration and appended.  The subcommittee initially would have a 
large project to overhaul the entire set of Forms.  However, once the initial 
modifications to the Forms are made, the Forms can be gradually changed 
and amended in coordination with changes to the Rules.  By having 
practitioners, academics, and judges form a subcommittee dedicated to 
amending the Forms in concert with any amendments to the Rules, the 
Forms could become a more practical, modernized, and helpful practice tool. 
By delegating the Forms to a subcommittee, this also could be an 
                                                          
 365.   October 2009 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 266, at 14. 
 366.   See discussion supra Part I.C. (discussing the different approaches courts have taken in 
harmonizing Twombly and Iqbal and the pleading forms).  If it is found impossible to illustrate what 
would suffice for pleading under the Twiqbal standard, perhaps it is the ambiguity and vagueness of 
the plausibility standard that should be modified instead of the Forms.  However, this comment is a 
critique of abrogation of the Forms, not a critique of Twiqbal. 
 367.   October 2009 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 266, at 16. 
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opportunity to resolve some of the concerns about the workload of the 
Advisory Committee.  One of the primary arguments for abrogation 
concerned the overloading of the Advisory Committee.
368
  Creating a 
subcommittee dedicated to the Forms would take some of the workload from 
the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee.
369
  By frontloading 
the work on the amendments and delegating creation of the Forms to a 
subcommittee, the Advisory Committee could take a more hands-off 
approach and have the subcommittee accomplish a significant amount of the 
work before it even sees the amendments to the Forms.  While the Advisory 
Committee is overloaded with major projects in other Rules,
370
 there is no 
reason a subcommittee could not take on amending the Forms 
comprehensively and in the future amend alongside the Rules.  By 
delegating the responsibility, the Advisory Committee would not be 
burdened beyond its normal role in the Rules Enabling Act when reviewing 
the Forms.  The Forms will also have the added benefit of providing a better 
enforcement mechanism of the Rules amended and created by the Advisory 
Committee.  Where the Advisory Committee feels a certain Rule amendment 
will be unclear or difficult to implement, a Form can be created to 
demonstrate sufficiency under the Rule. 
If the Forms were adopted through a rigorous debate in a subcommittee 
comprised of experts in the field composed of both the bench and bar, the 
subcommittee could address the concern that the Forms are simply “not 
useful” in modern practice.
371
  By modernizing the Forms for current 
litigation needs, practitioners would likely be much more inclined to use the 
Forms for two reasons.  First, the subcommittee could be charged with 
filling some of the gaps in the Forms that the Advisory Committee has 
expressed concern with, particularly in the discovery Forms.
372
  The Forms 
do not have to cover every subject addressed in the Rules because providing 
                                                          
 368.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 409 (“[Amendment to the 
Forms] would require a heavy commitment of Enabling Act resources, particularly by the Advisory 
Committee.”).  
 369.   The Advisory Committee has launched subcommittees before to take on projects. For 
example, the Rule 84 Subcommittee was officially launched in November 2011 to investigate a 
recommendation for Rule 84.  Minutes of Civil Rules Advisory Committee, U.S. COURTS 35–36 
(Nov. 7–8, 2011) [hereinafter November 2011 Advisory Committee Meeting], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2011-min.pdf.  
 370.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 408–09. 
 371.   See, e.g., 2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 93 (“Many of the forms are out of 
date. . . . The increased use of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the enhanced pleading requirements 
of Rule 9 and some federal statutes, the proliferation of statutory and other causes of action, and the 
increased complexity of most modern cases have resulted in a detailed level of pleading that is far 
beyond that illustrated in the forms.”). 
 372.   November 2012 Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 15, at 421. 
2015] DOWN GO THE FORMS 371 
a manual of forms is not the purpose of the Appendix.
373
  The subcommittee 
can take on the creation of forms where it deems uniformity important or 
where authoritative command may be necessary.  As the Forms cover a 
wider scope, the Forms will be more useful to practitioners. 
Second, because the Forms go through the same Rules Enabling process 
as the Rules, the Forms that survive will undoubtedly be worthy of 
authoritative command.  Through the Rules Enabling process, practitioners 
and academics outside of the Advisory Committee and the subcommittee 
will have a chance to comment on the Forms and to take some ownership in 
the direction of the Forms.  Conversely, practitioners do not have a say in 
the forms created through local rules, the Administrative Office for the 
United States Courts, or private online databases.  Also, the alternative 
forms created through local rules or through the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts do not allow for the uniformity, conformity, and 
sufficiency with the Rules that Rule 84 and the Official Forms provide.  
Furthermore, the alternatives are simply not put through the same rigorous 
debate and thorough review as the Forms appended to the Rules.  These 
alternative sources of forms would provide illustrations, but they would 
never provide authority.  Official Forms are clearly superior in this regard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Advisory Committee cited a lack of enthusiasm for public 
comment on the abrogation of Rule 84 as a sign that Rule 84 should be put 
to rest,
374
 this does not make this amendment any less important than an 
amendment that garners a lot of attention in the legal community.  The 
conclusory reasoning for abrogation of Rule 84 cited by the Supreme Court, 
Judicial Conference, the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee, and 
the Rule 84 Subcommittee ignores the true purpose of the Forms and the 
consequences of abrogation going forward.  The adoption of the final 
sentence of the official Advisory Committee Note that the abrogation of 
Rule 84 and the Forms is not to have an effect on the pleading standards
375
 
will likely not be enough to defeat the view that the Forms and Rule 84 are 
                                                          
 373.   The Forms have never been intended to be comprehensive.  As the introductory statement 
to the Forms stated prior to repeal, “[t]he following forms are intended for illustration only.  They 
are limited in number.  No attempt is made to furnish a manual of forms.”  FED. R. CIV. P. App. of 
Forms Introductory Statement (1946) (repealed 2007).  The Advisory Committee has already spoken 
on the creation of a manual of forms with the rejection of the 1989 amendment proposal for a 
practice manual.  See supra notes 32–36, 50–51 and accompanying text (explaining the 1989 
proposal for a practice manual). 
 374.   2014 Judicial Conference, supra note 10, at 16. 
 375.   2015 Rules Package, supra note 178, at 132, 139. 
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being abolished because they do not comply with Twiqbal.  The tension 
between the pleading standards and the pleading Forms has underlined the 
abrogation debate through every step of the Rules Enabling Act process.  
Despite any explicit statement to the contrary, abrogation is an implicit 
endorsement of the Twiqbal standard of plausibility pleading as a heightened 
standard going forward without expressly amending a Rule or giving the 
bench and bar the opportunity to discuss the changing pleading standards.
376
  
The only solution to avoid implicitly heightening the pleading standards is to 
keep Rule 84 and the Forms. 
With the lack of acknowledgement of the change by the public, the 
abrogation of Rule 84 may go through the Rules Enabling Act process 
without notice or understanding of the true consequences.  Judges, 
practitioners, and pro se litigants will all suffer from the loss of the Forms as 
authoritative illustrations of the Rules perhaps without even knowing it 
happened.  All the negative consequences of abrogation could simply be 
avoided by delegating to a subcommittee the duty to update the Forms the 
same way the Administrative Office of the United States Courts does.  
Perhaps, with updated Forms, there will not be such a lack of enthusiasm as 
is cited in the reasoning for abrogation.  This seemingly simple abrogation 
could have profound effects that go beyond what is imagined by the Rule 84 
Subcomittee, the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, and the 
Judicial Conference because abrogation was simply not thought through.  
Abrogation will leave in its wake more questions than answers, including for 
example, what is sufficient under Twiqbal, and what does the legal 
community look to for pleading sufficiency.  The clear route to avoid this is 
to amend the Forms instead of abrogate. 
 
                                                          
 376.   Spencer, The Forms, supra note 234, at 1; see generally Coleman, supra 75, at 1. 
